Beyond Law Enforcement: \u3ci\u3eCamreta v. Greene\u3c/i\u3e, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine by Gupta-Kagan, Josh
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Law School
12-2012
Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child
Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform
the Fourth Amendment Special Needs Doctrine
Josh Gupta-Kagan
University of South Carolina, jgkagan@law.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Encorcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations and the Need to Reform the Fourth
Amendment Special Needs Doctrine, 4 Tulane Law Review 2 53-425, (2012).
353 
Beyond Law Enforcement:  Camreta v. 
Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and 
the Need To Reform the Fourth Amendment 
Special Needs Doctrine 
Josh Gupta-Kagan* 
The Fourth Amendment “special needs” doctrine distinguishes between searches and 
seizures that serve the “normal need for law enforcement” and those that serve some other 
special need, excusing non-law-enforcement searches and seizures from the warrant and 
probable cause requirements.  The United States Supreme Court has never justified drawing this 
bright line exclusively around law enforcement searches and seizures but not around those that 
threaten important noncriminal constitutional rights. 
Child protection investigations illustrate the problem:  millions of times each year, state 
child protection authorities search families’ homes and seize children for interviews about 
alleged maltreatment.  Only a minority of these investigations involve suspected crimes, so most 
fall on the special needs side of the line.  This result undervalues the consequences of child 
protection investigations on children (a severe infringement of their right to family integrity) and 
on parents (the loss of their children and the stigma of a child abuse or neglect charge). 
This Article proposes a new approach to the special needs doctrine:  the doctrine should 
distinguish between searches and seizures that implicate fundamental constitutional rights and 
those that do not.  It breaks new ground in identifying a theoretical value to such a bright line:  it 
gives governments less incentive to interfere with liberty by seeking alternative means to 
achieve their goals.  To realize this value most effectively, the line must be drawn to value all 
fundamental constitutional rights, not only those connected to the criminal justice system.  In 
child protection, it would push states to choose less-liberty-infringing models of providing 
assistance to vulnerable families, which the empirical record shows would serve children and the 
child protection system’s goals more effectively. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Nimrod Greene is arrested for allegedly molesting a boy 
unrelated to him.  The boy’s mother reports that Greene’s wife “had 
talked to her about how she doesn’t like the way [Greene] makes [their 
nine-year-old daughter] sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated, and 
she doesn’t like the way he acts when she is sitting on his lap.”1  A 
child protection investigator goes to the nine-year-old child’s school, 
                                                 
 1. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 
S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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takes her out of class, brings her to a private room, and closes the door.  
The girl denies that Greene abused her and signals that she does not 
want to talk further.  But the investigator does not accept her denials 
and repeatedly asks about abuse.  After two hours, she says that her 
father did abuse her.  The investigator removes her from her parents’ 
custody and places her in foster care.  She recants the allegation.  State 
officials have a doctor examine her; no evidence of sexual abuse is 
found.  Three weeks later, lacking evidence to prove abuse, the state 
sends her home and closes the case.2 
 Under the prevailing Fourth Amendment “special needs” 
doctrine, the seizure of the child in the above scenario is likely 
constitutional.  The doctrine provides that searches and seizures 
serving states’ “normal need for law enforcement” require a warrant 
and probable cause, while searches and seizures serving “special needs 
beyond . . . law enforcement” do not.3  The doctrine offers no means 
“to discriminate among distinct sorts of non-law-enforcement 
objectives,”4 so the importance of the noncriminal constitutional rights 
implicated by the searches and seizures are of no import.  With no law 
enforcement purpose, no warrant or probable cause would be required.  
Although the searches and seizures involved could still be tested for 
reasonableness, their qualification as a special need is almost certainly 
outcome-determinative.  Following this analysis, millions of 
investigative steps like the fact pattern above (seizures of children and 
parents for nonconsensual interviews, searches of families’ homes, and 
inspections of children’s bodies) occur each year.5 
 This Article argues that the special needs doctrine should draw a 
line between searches and seizures that threaten fundamental 
constitutional rights beyond the searches and seizures themselves, and 
                                                 
 2. This fact pattern resembles that in Greene v. Camreta, which is discussed in Part 
II.A, with one difference:  in Greene, a deputy sheriff joined the social worker in the 
interview and investigated the alleged sex abuse for possible criminal charges.  Greene, 588 
F.3d at 1016-20. 
 3. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 4. Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding 
Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89.  Schulhofer argues that the law enforcement versus other 
purposes distinction is “chimerical and irrelevant.”  Id.  He proposes replacing that distinction 
with one between government activity to achieve some kind of “social control” and searches 
and seizures “in aid of the internal governance objectives of public enterprises.”  Id. at 118.  I 
discuss that proposal infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 5. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 2010, at 20, 22 (2011), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/ 
pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf. 
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those that do not.6  By focusing only on the presence or absence of law 
enforcement purposes, the present doctrine ignores the searches’ and 
seizures’ infringements on children’s and parents’ privacy rights and 
the severe consequences (infringement on the fundamental substantive 
due process right to family integrity) that flow from these searches and 
seizures.  The doctrine also ignores a basic purpose of Fourth 
Amendment law:  to distinguish between searches and seizures that 
require a warrant and probable cause to check executive branch 
discretion and those that do not.  When a search or seizure threatens 
fundamental constitutional rights and involves significant executive 
discretion, a warrant and probable cause should be required. 
 Child protection searches and seizures illustrate the problematic 
analysis and results created by the present special needs doctrine.  
Unlike special needs searches implicating public employment or other 
consequences beyond fundamental constitutional rights, child 
protection investigations implicate the Fourteenth Amendment family 
integrity rights of millions of children and parents every year.  Child 
protection investigations have given rise to two United States Supreme 
Court special needs cases, including Camreta v. Greene, on which the 
above fact pattern is based, and which was decided in 2011 on 
jurisdictional, not Fourth Amendment, grounds.7  Unlike the fact 
pattern above, Camreta involved a joint investigation between a deputy 
sheriff and a child protection worker, both of whom were present in the 
interview.  The case centered on whether the deputy sheriff’s 
involvement placed the seizure on the normal need for law 
enforcement side of the special needs line.8  The special needs doctrine 
mandated this focus, but it ignores the profound questions that arise 
independent of any law enforcement involvement.  Because the only 
potential criminal consequences in Camreta were faced by the 
suspected father, the doctrine’s law enforcement focus ignored the 
consequences to the child, who was separated from her family and 
placed in state custody, infringing upon one of the most fundamental 
                                                 
 6. By “fundamental constitutional rights,” I mean those rights that have been held to 
apply to the states because they are “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” or that 
have been held to be fundamental constitutional rights through some other source, most likely 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see infra text 
accompanying note 255. 
 7. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); see Ferguson v. City of Charleston 
(Ferguson II ) , 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 8. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
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liberty interests enjoyed by anyone, especially children.  The doctrine 
ignored the invasiveness of the seizure itself, the consequences for the 
constitutional right of family integrity, and the level of discretion 
involved in performing the seizure.  And when there is no law 
enforcement involvement (as occurs millions of times every year), the 
doctrine permits significant invasions of children’s and families’ 
privacy at home and elsewhere, implicating fundamental constitutional 
rights without consideration of the severity or credibility of 
allegations.9  In the majority of cases, affecting millions of families, 
child protection investigations infringe on liberty and threaten family 
integrity without giving children or families any benefit in return.10  
Moreover, the doctrine ignores a troubling aspect of many child 
protection investigations:  poorly performed interviews of children, 
such as the interview in Camreta, which are inadequately regulated by 
state agencies.  When abuse or neglect has not occurred, these 
interviews may create false allegations that lead to unnecessary state 
intervention in families.  When abuse or neglect has occurred, they 
create evidentiary problems when states appropriately seek to 
intervene in families. 
 The special needs case law offers no explanation of why law 
enforcement purposes make searches and seizures so different from all 
other searches and thus no adequate justification for the doctrine’s 
handling of child protection cases.  This doctrine, first coined in 1985 
in New Jersey v. T.L.O., is now the basis of multiple Supreme Court 
holdings and lower court litigation.  But in the intervening quarter-
century, the Supreme Court has not explained what makes searches 
and seizures with law enforcement purposes different, why searches 
that affect fundamental but noncriminal constitutional rights ought not 
be treated the same as those that do not affect constitutional rights, or 
how a line defined by law enforcement needs differentiates searches 
and seizures that need a warrant and probable cause from those that do 
not. 
 Despite its flaws, the special needs doctrine distinguishes 
searches and seizures that threaten important rights and are thus more 
invasive from those that do not.  This Article breaks new ground by 
identifying the value of drawing a bright line between searches and 
seizures implicating some fundamental rights and those that do not.  
Such a bright line values constitutional liberties by creating incentives 
                                                 
 9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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for policy makers to avoid more invasive forms of state intervention; 
by choosing a policy option that infringes on liberty less, governments 
can ensure the administrative state can do its work without the burdens 
and limitations that come with a warrant and probable cause 
requirement.  By focusing on the administrative state’s workings, the 
doctrine can also push the government to develop clear administrative 
procedures that adequately substitute for a warrant procedure.  The 
doctrine should be reformed to account for searches and seizures 
conducted with the purpose of implicating significant noncriminal 
constitutional rights and for the level of executive branch discretion. 
 This Article connects child protection investigations and the 
special needs doctrine that governs them, both of which independently 
have received critical, academic focus.  This Article builds off of that 
recent work, while offering new analysis of both child protection cases 
and the special needs doctrine.  Doriane Lambelet Coleman has made 
a powerful normative argument against excepting child protection 
searches and seizures from warrant and probable cause requirements:  
the invasiveness of these searches, measured against the strength of 
privacy and liberty interests at stake, requires traditional Fourth 
Amendment protections.11  Her normative case needs no repetition 
here.  Her doctrinal argument, however, depends on the special needs 
doctrine in its present form and concludes that the entanglement 
between law enforcement and civil child protection authorities in these 
searches renders the special needs doctrine inapplicable.12  This 
conclusion overstates the extent of law enforcement entanglement.  
Many, perhaps most, child protection searches and seizures do not 
involve law enforcement and do not threaten or result in law 
enforcement consequences.  Absent such law enforcement entangle-
ment, the currently prevailing special needs test will apply to most 
such searches and seizures and would likely approve of the warrantless 
searches and seizures that Coleman has argued so powerfully against.  
Considered from her perspective, then, the special needs doctrine 
needs reevaluation. 
 The academy has criticized the special needs doctrine, including 
the law enforcement purpose threshold, for its “doctrinal 
incoherence”13 and for being “notoriously unclear,”14 but the academy 
                                                 
 11. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle To Save the Children:  The 
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 413, 539-40 (2005). 
 12. Id. at 425-26. 
 13. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 89. 
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has spent little time considering how the doctrine’s bright line, which 
has existed for multiple decades and remains strong, could be tied 
more meaningfully to the rights implicated by specific searches and 
seizures.  An early and oft-cited work called for replacing the “law 
enforcement versus other purposes” distinction with a distinction 
between searches and seizures serving “inter[n]al gover[n]ance 
imperatives of a self-contained public activity” and searches and 
seizures serving “external social control,”15 an approach which only 
indirectly considers the constitutional rights at stake and less 
effectively incentivizes government to choose less-liberty-infringing 
policy options. 
 This Article will proceed as follows:  Part II will explore child 
protection searches, both in Camreta and more broadly, arguing that 
the special needs doctrine has failed to shape sound decisions in those 
areas.  Part II will also summarize research showing that children 
subject to child protection investigations are not helped by the status 
quo and argue that a less-liberty-infringing response can more 
effectively help the children and families, who are the subjects of child 
abuse and neglect allegations. 
 Part III will explore the special needs doctrine’s origins, 
boundaries, and development, and, in so doing, it will reveal the 
doctrine’s unjustified assumptions about law enforcement searches and 
failure to analyze when a warrant and probable cause are required, 
which are problems that lead directly to the doctrine’s mishandling of 
child protection cases.  In tracing the doctrine from its historical 
origins to the present day, Part III will also identify its focus not only 
on searches and seizures themselves but also on their consequences to 
individuals searched and seized. 
 Part IV will develop the important values contained in the special 
needs doctrine but never coherently theorized, especially its ability to 
push governments to invade liberty less and to develop legislative and 
regulatory regimes that check official discretion when such invasions 
occur.  It will then explain how the Supreme Court should strip away 
the arbitrary distinction between law enforcement and other purposes 
and reform the doctrine to ask, instead, whether searches and seizures 
implicate fundamental rights and whether administrative procedures 
are adequate to replace a judicial warrant procedure.  Applying this 
reformed test to child protection investigations, Part IV will illustrate 
                                                                                                             
 14. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 254, 257 (2011); see also id. at 257-58 (summarizing past criticism). 
 15. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 89, 118. 
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how these reforms will lead to results that are more just, more 
coherent, and more consistent with a principled approach to the special 
needs doctrine. 
II. CAMRETA V. GREENE AND CHILD PROTECTION SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES:  ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT 
SPECIAL NEEDS TEST 
 The Fourth Amendment issues raised by child protection searches 
and seizures illustrate the problems that come from the special needs 
doctrine’s bright line between law enforcement searches and all other 
searches.  I focus on child protection searches and seizures for four 
reasons. 
 First, these searches and seizures effectively illustrate the special 
needs problem because they implicate the fundamental but 
noncriminal constitutional right of family integrity, “perhaps the oldest 
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e Supreme] 
Court.”16  Relatedly, the various fact patterns of child protection cases 
have presented hard special needs questions to the Supreme Court.  
Two different child protection cases, Camreta and Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston (Ferguson II),17 have already done so.  Given the lack of 
resolution to the Fourth Amendment issue in Camreta, a case which 
the Court dismissed for mootness,18 a future child protection case is 
likely to shape special needs doctrine.19 
 Second, analyzing child protection searches adds to our academic 
understanding of the special needs doctrine.  Courts and academics 
have traditionally addressed all “administrative search” cases under 
                                                 
 16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 17. 532 U.S. 67 (2001); see discussion infra Part III.C. 
 18. 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2011). 
 19. There are other possible scenarios.  State action to commit individuals 
involuntarily to mental institutions requires clear and convincing evidence that the individual 
is mentally ill and must be institutionalized to protect the individual or others.  Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).  Evidence might include the individual’s statements, medical 
records, and articles at their home, e.g., id. at 421, and might be gathered by entering an 
individual’s home or seizing the individual for a mental health evaluation, Gooden v. Howard 
County, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (involving an entry into a private home, 
justified by reasonably perceived exigent circumstances).  Civil schemes regulate individuals’ 
right to own firearms—now recognized as a fundamental constitutional right and applied 
against states, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)—and some include 
provisions for seizing such guns, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2502.10 (2012) (establishing an admini-
strative procedure for revoking a certificate permitting gun ownership and compelling 
surrender of a weapon without mentioning a warrant or probable cause).  If such procedures 
are valid, it is because the Second Amendment permits significant regulation, not because of 
the civil versus criminal distinction. 
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one heading, ignoring important differences between categories of 
cases.  Others in the academy have contributed to “disentangling” 
different types of cases, and thus analyzing each category more 
coherently.20  For example, Eve Brensike Primus identifies two 
categories:  “dragnet” cases, such as police roadblock or health 
inspection cases, and “special subpopulation search” cases, relating to 
individuals with reduced expectations of privacy.21  Child protection 
searches do not fall neatly into either category and thus raise unique 
questions about the doctrine.  They are not dragnet searches because 
all individuals are not stopped equally; child protection investigations 
only follow individualized allegations of child abuse or neglect.22  Nor 
do these investigations involve individuals with reduced expectations 
of privacy; children or parents who are searched or seized at their 
homes (as is common in child protection investigations) have no 
reduced privacy expectations.  Arguably, children at school have 
reduced expectations of privacy (though this point was contested in 
Camreta,23 the better view is that children do not have an across-the-
board reduction in their privacy interests at school and the proper 
analysis is context-specific24), but that only addresses a slice of child 
protection investigations. 
 Third, child protection searches and seizures represent a 
widespread and important issue in their own right and affect millions 
of children (and millions more adults) every year.25  Moreover, the 
scope of these searches and seizures illustrates important policy 
incentives that may result from reforming the doctrine.  Child 
protection agencies receive nearly 1.6 million reports of alleged child 
abuse or neglect each year,26 regarding nearly three million children.27  
                                                 
 20. Primus, supra note 14, at 260.  Christopher Slobogin has agreed that scholars 
have “tended to lump all of these decisions together,” even if Eve Brensike Primus makes an 
“overstated” case.  Christopher Slobogin, The Implications of Disentanglement, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 103, 104 (2011). 
 21. Primus, supra note 14, at 260. 
 22. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 23. Infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 24. Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home:  When 
Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 68-69 (2011). 
 25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 26. The federal government counted 1,581,882 reports.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra 
note 5, at 11.  This figure excludes child protection hotline calls which did not report alleged 
abuse or neglect.  This figure only includes data from forty-five states; extrapolated to 
include all states and territories, there were more than 2 million reports.  See id. at 5 (listing 
3.3 million reports, multiplied by the “screened in” rate of 60.7%). 
 27. The federal government counted 2,987,515 children.  Id. at 32.  This only 
includes the “[c]hildren [w]ho [r]eceived a [r]esponse” from child protective services (CPS), 
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Those large numbers should be understood in the context of what 
happens in the resulting investigation.  The majority of investigations, 
more than 80%, are closed without an administrative finding of abuse 
or neglect.28  Perhaps even more of these investigations should close 
without findings of abuse or neglect.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has described administrative findings 
of abuse or neglect as “at best imperfect,” noting that three-quarters of 
administrative challenges succeed in reversing such findings.29   
 Frequently, these challenges occur only when the administrative 
findings lead a parent to lose a job,30 suggesting that many parents with 
legitimate claims do not challenge these administrative findings.  
Moreover, a long backlog of administrative challenges can occur in 
some jurisdictions.31  (Of course, there may also be cases closed 
without a finding of abuse or neglect, in which such a finding would 
be justified.)  Child protection agencies substantiate abuse or neglect 
in the remaining 20% of reports, affecting about 695,000 children.32  
Neglect is the type of maltreatment found by child protection agencies 
in the majority of cases; physical or sexual abuse accounts for no more 
than 26.8% of cases.33 
 Each of the three million children who are subject to these 
investigations has at least one parent or caretaker.  Many have one or 
more siblings, and many share homes with people beyond their nuclear 
families.  The total scope of child protection investigations is thus quite 
                                                                                                             
id., meaning it excludes children subject to referrals “screened out” by CPS agencies, see id. 
at 5 (discussing screening procedures).  Including children who were the subjects of multiple 
hotline calls and multiple CPS responses, the government counted 3,604,100 children—
showing that a significant number of affected children face multiple CPS investigations each 
year.  This is referred to as the “[d]uplicate count.”  Id. at 32. 
 28. Id. at 20. 
 29. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See John O’Brien, NY Denied Thousands Accused of Child Abuse the Chance To 
Clear Their Name, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.syracuse.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2010/03/ny_denied_thousands_accused_of.html (describing long delays that 
led state officials to shred administrative requests).  Further details are available on the Web 
site for a related class lawsuit.  See Law Offices of Thomas Hoffman, N.Y. ST. WIDE CENT. 
REGISTRY CHILD ABUSE & MALTREATMENT CLASS ACTION WEBSITE, http://www.registryclass 
action.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
 32. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 5, at 20, 22. 
 33. Id. at 24.  The number may be lower than 26.8% because that figure double-
counts children found to have been both physically and sexually abused.  The federal data 
does not separately report the proportion of child protection hotline reports of neglect (as 
compared with abuse).  One study that used small samples of hotline calls suggests that the 
majority of hotline reports are also of neglect.  JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD 
PROTECTION:  HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT 14 (1998). 
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large:  several million—perhaps as many as ten million—children and 
adults are subject to searches and seizures at home, school, and 
elsewhere every year.  Following their own protocols, child protection 
agencies insist on inspecting homes and interviewing children, parents, 
and other caregivers in each investigation.34  After investigations that 
touch all of these individuals, the number of children that child 
protection agencies remove from their families is fairly small:  about 
254,000 children, or 8.5% of the 3 million children subject to these 
investigations.35 
 Examining the data has led some child welfare experts to argue 
that child protection agencies do not need to investigate several million 
children in order to protect a quarter million by removing them from 
parental custody.  These commentators argue that the current rate of 
investigation requires child protection agencies to spend too much time 
investigating cases unlikely to lead to removal, either because the 
allegations are not credible or because the allegations are not 
sufficiently severe—unnecessarily intervening in many families and 
draining limited resources from cases that need greater attention.36  
Connecticut’s reformist child welfare director estimated that 40% of all 
investigations could be diverted to a less adversarial approach.37  More 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections would create incentives for 
states to triage child protection hotline calls more effectively and thus 
reduce the scope of privacy invasions that these investigations entail. 
 Relatedly, some evidence exists that by not investigating families 
at lower risk of maltreatment, child protection authorities can better 
protect children in more-serious cases, and therefore create incentives 
to limit the number of child protection searches and seizures that could 
also serve the government’s interest in protecting children.  A study of 
Missouri’s “differential response” pilot (through which state officials 
only investigated more-severe allegations and diverted less-severe 
reports) concluded that by reducing the number of less-serious 
investigations, authorities had more time to investigate sexual abuse 
                                                 
 34. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
 35. The federal government counted 254,375 children who entered foster care in 
fiscal year 2010.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
AFCARS REPORT:  PRELIMINARY FY 2010 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2011, at 3 (2011), available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport18.pdf. 
 36. E.g., WALDFOGEL, supra note 33, at 19 (describing a study in which over 60% of 
cases reported to CPS were unsubstantiated). 
 37. Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, DCF Head Gets the Authority She Sought To Fix 
Troubled Agency, CT MIRROR (June 10, 2011), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/12907/dcf-
wrap. 
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cases.  Those investigations were more comprehensive and allowed 
police to gather enough evidence to arrest more perpetrators of sexual 
abuse, preventing them from preying on more children.38 
 Fourth, these searches and seizures have occurred frequently and 
for many years without definitive rulings on their constitutionality or 
much attention from the academy.39  Camreta is one of a relatively 
small set of cases challenging Child Protective Services’ (CPS’) 
investigatory tactics.  As a result, Fourth Amendment concepts appear 
to be largely foreign to the day-to-day operations of child protection 
investigations.  A 225-page manual guiding District of Columbia 
investigations, for instance, does not mention the Fourth Amendment 
and does not refer to “probable cause,” “warrant,” or “reasonable 
suspicion” as limits to investigators’ authority.40  Coleman has taken a 
crucial step toward addressing the Fourth Amendment status of child 
protection searches, making a compelling normative argument for 
applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards (probable cause and 
warrant requirements) to child protection searches and seizures.41  But 
Coleman frames her argument in connection to her conclusion that the 
special needs doctrine should not apply to such searches; she argues 
against applying some other “child welfare exception” to the warrant 
and probable cause requirements for such searches.  I am not so 
sanguine as to suggest that the current special needs doctrine would 
not apply to child protection searches;42 at the very least, many cases 
will present less child protection and law enforcement entanglement 
than Camreta did, making Coleman’s normative argument more 
difficult doctrinally. 
                                                 
 38. L. ANTHONY LOMAN, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 
IMPROVES TRADITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:  CRIMINAL ARRESTS FOR SEVERE PHYSICAL AND 
SEXUAL ABUSE (2005), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/DiffRespAndInvestigations.pdf. 
 39. Coleman’s article is the clear exception to this lack of attention, and Coleman 
began her article by noting the “dearth of scholarly attention” to the subject.  Coleman, supra 
note 11, at 423. 
 40. D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS. ADMIN., 
INVESTIGATIONS:  PROCEDURAL OPERATIONAL MANUAL (2011), http://cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/ 
Publication Files/CFSA PDF Files/About CFSA/Publications/POMS/Investigations-POM.pdf.  
The manual refers to probable cause as the standard by which the Superior Court of D.C.’s 
Family Court Operations Division will judge whether allegations of abuse or neglect are true 
and thus whether a child may be removed, id. at 58, but the standard is not used in connection 
to the child protection investigation itself.  Similarly, the manual refers to search warrants 
executed by police that lead to evidence of child abuse or neglect, id. at 96, but not as 
something that limit child protection investigations. 
 41. Coleman, supra note 11, at 508-38. 
 42. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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 This Part will first explain Camreta’s facts, then the themes it 
illustrates in child protection searches and seizures beyond those facts.  
It will then explore how the case’s litigation illustrates the core 
problems with the current version of the special needs doctrine, and 
why reforming that doctrine is required to provide coherent guidance 
in child protection investigations. 
A. Camreta v. Greene:  Facts 
 An Oregon Department of Human Services caseworker, Bob 
Camreta, and Deschutes County deputy sheriff, James Alford, received 
allegations that Nimrod Greene had molested his daughters, S.G. and 
K.G.43  The allegations triggered a civil child protection investigation 
by Camreta and a criminal investigation by Alford.  Greene was 
arrested for sexually abusing an unrelated seven-year-old boy who had 
told police that Greene had touched the boy’s penis over his pants 
twice during a visit to the boy’s home while drunk.  The boy’s mother 
told the police that Greene’s wife, Sarah Greene, said, “[S]he doesn’t 
like the way [he] makes [S.G. and K.G.] sleep in his bed when he is 
intoxicated” and that Sarah Greene had made other comments 
expressing similar concern regarding Greene’s behavior toward his 
daughters while drunk.44 
 About one week later, Greene was released from jail.  Camreta 
learned of his release and of his resulting unsupervised contact with 
S.G. and K.G.  Three days passed without action or investigation.  
Camreta and Alford then went to the school of S.G., who, at the age of 
nine years, was the older sibling.  Camreta intentionally chose not to 
seek the consent of either of S.G.’s parents and to interview S.G. at 
school so that she would be “away from the potential influence of 
suspects, including parents.”45  Camreta did not seek a warrant or any 
court order before the interview. 
 At Camreta’s request, a school counselor took S.G. from her 
classroom to a private room at the school where she was left alone 
with Camreta and Alford.  S.G. felt “scared.”  Camreta and Alford kept 
her alone in the room for two hours while they interviewed her.46  
                                                 
 43. The children are identified only by initials in all public court documents. 
 44. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 45. Id. 
 46. These facts reflect S.G.’s account.  Some facts were disputed—for instance, 
Camreta and Alford claimed the interview lasted about one hour, not two.  But the case was 
litigated and decided on the defendants’ summary judgment motion and subsequent appeals, 
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Alford had his firearm visible and did not ask questions during the 
interview.  Camreta took the lead, first asking S.G. if her father 
touched her.  S.G. responded in the affirmative, but emphasized that 
these were good touches:  hugs, kisses, “piggy-back rides, rides on his 
shoulders and horsey rides.”47  Camreta did not accept that answer, and 
kept asking S.G. if her father touched her “in a bad way.”  The 
questions repeated until, in S.G.’s words, “I just started saying yes to 
whatever he said.”48 
 Ironically, the facts most relevant to the litigation about this 
interview—Alford’s presence and the criminal investigation—had little 
relevance to S.G.’s understanding of the case.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit offered this summary of S.G.’s 
deposition:  “With respect to Alford’s presence, S.G. stated that she is 
generally comfortable around police officers, that Alford was nice to 
her and did not do anything to scare her, and that she trusted him.”49  
Her brief to the Supreme Court emphasized that she was “scared” 
when a school counselor left her alone with two men she did not know, 
and that she decided to falsely report sexual abuse because she wanted 
“just to get out of the room” and feared that her school bus would 
leave without her, not because of any extra coercion created by 
Alford’s presence or behavior.50  The coercive interrogation and its 
potential consequences, not Alford’s presence or involvement, left S.G. 
“so upset . . . that she vomited five times that night after returning 
home.”51 
 After the interview, both criminal and civil child protection 
authorities believed they had sufficient evidence to act.52  A grand jury 
indicted Greene for felony sexual assault of S.G. and the unrelated boy.  
A court ordered Greene to have no contact with S.G. or K.G.  Camreta 
discussed the no contact order with Sarah Greene, and he left 
convinced that she believed Greene was not abusive and that she 
would not protect her children from future abuse (an assertion Sarah 
                                                                                                             
so, like the courts deciding the cases, this Article takes the facts “in the light most favorable 
to” S.G.  Id. at 1017 & n.1. 
 47. Id. at 1017. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Brief for Respondents at 2, 4, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 
09-1454 and 09-1478) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/09_1454_Brief_Updates/09-1454_Respondent 
Brief.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 4. 
 52. Greene, 588 F.3d at 1018. 
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Greene denied).53  Camreta then filed a petition in the local juvenile 
court asking for protective custody of S.G. and K.G.  The court issued 
the order and the government removed S.G. and K.G. from their 
parents and placed them in foster care.54 
 S.G. and K.G. remained in state custody for twenty days.  During 
that time, the state sent them both to the Kids Intervention and 
Diagnostic Service Center for interviews and physical exams.  S.G. 
told interviewers that her father had not abused her and that her 
statements to the contrary that were made to Camreta and Alford were 
false.  During the exam, S.G. was asked to undress, and examiners 
inspected her body, at times with a magnifying glass, and took pictures 
of her “private parts.”55  The exam did not reveal evidence of sexual 
abuse.56  The Department of Human Services then asked the juvenile 
court to return S.G. and K.G. to Sarah Greene’s custody, which the 
court did.57 
 The criminal charges against Greene resulted in a plea deal:  
Greene entered an Alford plea regarding the abuse of the unrelated 
boy, and the charges that he abused S.G. were dismissed.58 
 S.G. testified in her deposition that she continued to feel guilty 
for the false statements she made during her interrogation, and that she 
felt “real bad” because those statements led to her removal from her 
parents’ custody for several weeks and her father’s criminal 
prosecution.59 
B. Similar Themes in Child Protection Searches and Seizures 
Beyond Camreta 
 The Camreta facts evoke four key themes in child protection 
investigations.  First, child protection searches are often, though not 
usually, genuinely joint efforts between civil and criminal law 
enforcement agencies.  Camreta investigated the basis for a civil child 
welfare case and Alford the basis for a criminal case, and evidence 
does not suggest that one was cover for the other.  Such joint 
investigations between civil child protection agencies and law 
enforcement are commonplace, especially for allegations of sexual or 
                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1018-19. 
 55. The phrase “private parts” comes from S.G.’s deposition.  Id. at 1019. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1020. 
 58. Id.; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970). 
 59. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 12 & n.12. 
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physical abuse, where the facts, if accurate as alleged, typically 
establish both civil and criminal violations.  And as Coleman has 
explained in detail, collaboration between child protection agencies 
and law enforcement “is diverse and wide-ranging,” and it is likely to 
expand because of pressure to coordinate investigations.60 
 Still, the extent of this collaboration ought not be overestimated, 
and Coleman asks it to prove too much.  Laws requiring the 
notification of and cooperation with law enforcement apply to 
investigations of physical or sexual abuse, not generally to neglect or to 
less-severe allegations.61  But the majority of child protection 
allegations and investigations are for neglect, not physical or sexual 
abuse.  Nationally, only 26.8% of substantiated cases involve physical 
or sexual abuse, meaning the vast majority would not trigger 
mandatory law enforcement involvement.62  Reported cases suggest 
that even some physical abuse investigations do not involve police 
officers or the expected sharing of information for law enforcement 
purposes, rendering law enforcement entanglement a “contingency 
[that] is certainly of secondary importance.”63  As Wayne LaFave has 
pointed out, “[t]he police ordinarily need not be directly involved” in 
child protection investigations.64  One nonlegal commentator has put it 
                                                 
 60. Coleman, supra note 11, at 492-96. 
 61. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.301(f), quoted in Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & 
Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2002).  Although the line between allegations 
that must be shared and those that need not be shared varies by state, some line between 
severe and less-severe cases is common.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 12-18-504 (2012) (requiring 
reporting to law enforcement allegations of “severe maltreatment” only); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 17a-101b(c) (2012) (“sexual abuse or serious physical abuse” only); FLA. STAT. § 39.301(2) 
(2012) (“criminal conduct” only); GA. CODE § 19-7-5(e) (2012) (abuse only); 325 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/7 (2012) (severe cases only, such as death, brain damage, skull fractures, torture of a 
child, or sexual abuse); IOWA CODE § 232.70 (2011) (sexual abuse only); MISS. CODE § 43-
21-353(1) (2012) (sex abuse, serious physical injury, or other felony only); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 7B-307(a) (2011) (abuse only); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:38 (2002) (sexual abuse, “serious 
bodily injury,” or other crime only); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6365(c) (2012) (specifically 
referenced crimes such as homicide, sexual abuse, or serious physical injuries only). 
 62. Supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 63. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986).  Some statutes presume 
police will infrequently join investigations of physical or sexual abuse.  Texas law, for 
instance, provides that “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a local law enforcement agency to 
conduct a joint investigation” does not absolve a child protection agency of investigating.  
TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.301(g) (2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.301(2) (2012) (giving law 
enforcement discretion to accept or reject Florida Department of Children and Family 
Services reports for criminal investigation). 
 64. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,  SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10.3, at 105 (4th ed. 2010 update); see 
also Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 117 (permitting administrative and criminal sanctions for the 
same action “cannot by itself defeat an administrative scheme, if the administrative category 
is to exist at all”). 
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more strongly:  “[C]hild welfare agencies bear almost the complete 
responsibility for investigating child abuse.”65 
 Second, even when law enforcement entanglement exists, the 
search or seizure at issue may not implicate the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the person who would bear any law enforcement 
consequences.66  In Camreta, S.G. was seized and interrogated for two 
hours, but her father was arrested and charged with sexual abuse; S.G. 
faced no law enforcement consequences herself.  Camreta’s argument 
to the Supreme Court evoked this fact, framing the question presented 
as the Fourth Amendment standard to be applied “when a witness is 
temporarily detained.”67  This point affects searches and seizures of 
children only; searches and seizures of parents who are suspected of 
abuse or neglect, or of their homes, do implicate their Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 Third, specific child protection investigation steps occur 
regardless of the veracity or severity of the allegation.  For example, 
the Investigations Practice Operational Manual of the District of 
Columbia’s child welfare agency directs its investigators to “conduct a 
thorough investigation” into every allegation of child abuse or 
neglect.68  Each allegation triggers a requirement “to interview and 
assess ALL children in the home,” and such interviews must include 
physical observations (including photographs “when applicable or 
appropriate”).69  Social workers must “examine” all “family living 
areas,” “[d]etermine sleeping arrangements for all household 
members,” and interview all household members.70  All these steps 
must occur whenever somebody alleges that a child in a home has 
been abused or neglected.  That allegation could be severe (repeated 
sexual abuse) or relatively minor (if a parent leaves a ten-year-old child 
alone for several hours).  The allegation could be from a credible 
source (a pediatrician who has a record of making accurate allegations 
and who saw the child in question immediately prior to making the 
allegation) or a less credible one (an anonymous caller, a neighbor, a 
                                                 
 65. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID:  HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST 
CHILDREN’S LIVES 53 (1996). 
 66. The special needs doctrine’s focus on law enforcement consequences to the 
individual seized is discussed infra Part III.C. 
 67. Brief for Petitioner at i, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-1454 
and 09-1478), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/ 
publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1454_PetitionerBobCamreta.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 68. D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, supra note 40, at 76. 
 69. Id. at 77. 
 70. Id. at 86. 
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family member, or an ex-partner of the parent who is in an ongoing 
dispute with that parent).  The allegation may be the latest in a pattern 
of allegations from multiple sources about a family, or it may be the 
first allegation.  None of these variables affects the steps to be taken:  
search every room of the home and interview all children and adults in 
that home. 
 This phenomenon distinguishes child protection investigations 
from law enforcement investigations, in which the probable cause 
standard requires officials to evaluate a tipster’s “veracity,” “basis of 
knowledge,” and “overall reliability” before determining whether 
probable cause exists for a search or seizure in a criminal 
investigation.71  No similar factual evaluation generally occurs in child 
protection cases.  By removing discretion from the decision to 
investigate particular tips, the child protection system broadens the 
scope of invasive investigations beyond what is necessary to protect 
children.  In an extreme example, a woman in a mental hospital 
reported that her brother-in-law (with whom she had no contact for 
eighteen months and regarding whom she had previously made a false 
allegation) was in a satanic cult and planned to murder his two-year-
old son on the Fall Equinox.72  Despite the informant’s unreliability and 
lack of a basis of knowledge, authorities investigated the allegation, 
removed both the children from their parents, and subjected the 
children to abuse examinations (including body cavity examinations).  
The children stayed in state custody for 2½ months before being 
returned to their parents—with no evidence of any physical or sexual 
abuse discovered.73  Less-extreme examples abound.  A leading study 
of a set of child protection investigations found that to a large “extent 
. . . the system seems to be used for family and other quarrels,” that is, 
ex-partners, family members, or neighbors reporting abuse or neglect 
based on spite rather than evidence.74  The study found such reports 
less likely to be substantiated than others, yet they triggered the same 
invasive investigations.75 
 Although child protection law and policy prevent officials from 
exercising the discretion to decline to investigate particular reports, 
child protection investigators have a significant amount of discretion 
                                                 
 71. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). 
 72. Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 73. Id. at 1132-35.  The extreme state actions in Wallis should suffice to prove the 
search and seizure unreasonable even if the special needs test applied. 
 74. WALDFOGEL, supra note 33, at 19. 
 75. Id. 
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regarding when, where, and how to investigate, and they can use that 
discretion to invade liberty more.  Camreta, for instance, chose to 
interview S.G. at her school, during the school day, and without 
contacting her mother first, and—at least as alleged by S.G.—chose to 
keep S.G. in a room with him until she agreed that her father had 
molested her.  Other reported cases reflect the wide variety of searches 
performed by child protection investigators following their 
interpretation of case-specific facts.  Some are quite disturbing.  One 
investigator responded to a report that a six-year-old girl exhibited 
some sexualized behavior and decided to take photographs of the 
child’s vagina and buttocks, despite having no training in physically 
examining children for evidence of sexual abuse.  The investigator 
made the child’s mother “spread [her] labia and buttocks” so that the 
investigator could take pictures.76  The investigator’s supervisor 
testified that this action was within the investigator’s discretion.77  The 
child soon developed anxiety symptoms that required counseling, and 
her mother was reduced to tears; no evidence of abuse was found.78 
 Fourth, it is exceedingly difficult to discern the truth about 
specific allegations, and investigative steps taken by child protection 
authorities can hinder the search for truth.  Did Camreta pressure S.G. 
into making false allegations, which she recanted when his high-
pressure interrogation ended?  Or did S.G. tell the truth to Camreta, 
only to later change her story to protect her family or because of 
pressure from either or both of her parents?  Quite simply, we will 
never know.  If we assume that Greene was guilty of abusing his 
daughter, the facts of the interrogation (repeated, aggressive, leading 
questions of a nine-year-old child afraid she would be kept from going 
home) and S.G.’s subsequent recantation would make it difficult for 
the government to meet its burden of proving that Greene did, in fact, 
abuse S.G.  These facts might make S.G.’s earlier statements 
inadmissible.79  At the least, they would provide fertile grounds for 
cross-examination of both S.G. and Camreta and make for an 
                                                 
 76. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
 77. Id. at 399. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).  Wright ruled a 2½-year-old child’s 
out-of-court statements inadmissible when they followed leading questions by a doctor.  The 
Court did not require a set of fixed procedural safeguards, id. at 818, but found the particular 
statements at issue lacked sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause, id. at 827.  Wright did not address whether such statements would be admissible 
under rules of evidence in a civil case. 
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uncertain trial.  Moreover, S.G.’s statements to Camreta were not 
recorded, making independent verification of both her statements and 
his questioning impossible.  Effective investigative techniques are 
essential to both identifying child abuse and neglect and to gathering 
convincing evidence so that the state may act on it when appropriate.  
States (including Oregon, where Camreta occurred) have developed 
detailed guidelines to ensure appropriate techniques.80 
C. Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Litigation’s Focus on Whether 
It Was Primarily a Law Enforcement or Child Protection Seizure 
 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion, and Camreta’s and S.G.’s briefs to 
the Supreme Court, focused precisely where the special needs doctrine 
directed them to focus:  on the presence of a law enforcement purpose 
to Camreta and Alford’s seizure of S.G.  In this focus, the Ninth Circuit 
opinion and Supreme Court litigation illustrate some of the deeper 
problems in that doctrine. 
 Judge Marsha Berzon’s Ninth Circuit opinion concluded that the 
extensive entanglement between civil and criminal child abuse 
investigations generally, and in the investigations regarding S.G. and 
her father specifically, rendered the special needs doctrine 
inapplicable.81  But the opinion also expressed some discomfort with 
that result, acknowledging that protecting children through the civil 
foster care system and criminally sanctioning child abusers are both 
“governmental activity of the highest importance.”82  Despite the great 
importance of both civil and criminal purposes, the existence of only 
the latter determined the Ninth Circuit’s result. 
 Camreta’s arguments to the Supreme Court in favor of applying 
the special needs doctrine, and S.G.’s rebuttals, also illustrate some of 
the difficulties created by the special needs binary.  Camreta offered 
one argument relying on that binary, focusing on the lack of law 
enforcement consequences for S.G.,83 then a second argument that 
explicitly sought to merge criminal and civil investigations.84  The first 
                                                 
 80. SHERRY BOHANNAN ET AL., CRIME VICTIMS’ ASSISTANCE SECTION, OR. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OREGON INTERVIEWING GUIDELINES (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.doj.state. 
or.us/victims/pdf/orinterviewingguide.pdf. 
 81. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1025-30 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 
S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 82. Id. at 1029. 
 83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 19-21, 27-29.  Camreta also offered an 
analogy to school search cases, which he argued lessened children’s expectation of privacy.  
Id. at 30-34.  That argument is discussed infra note 141. 
 84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 30-34. 
 
 
 
 
2012] BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT 373 
 
argument ignores crucial elements of S.G.’s story, and the second runs 
headlong into the special needs doctrine’s binary. 
 Camreta first argued that S.G. was a mere witness, an argument 
that only makes sense if one focuses entirely on criminal conse-
quences.  Camreta relied on an earlier special needs case, Illinois v. 
Lidster, that upheld police officers’ right to briefly stop motorists to 
inquire whether they were witnesses to a crime at the location of the 
stop, and Camreta argued that like those motorists, S.G. was a 
potential witness to a crime and not a suspect.85  If one considers only 
the criminal investigation, this analogy has some force.  But S.G. faced 
much more serious consequences than being made a witness in a 
criminal case.  Her seizure and interrogation led the state to forcibly 
remove her and her sister from both her father and her mother and to 
place them in state custody for several weeks.  S.G.’s seizure and 
interrogation thus led directly to the emotional harms that are caused 
when the state separates children from their parents, deprived her of 
physical liberty by placing her in state custody, and subjected her to the 
various well-documented risks of living in foster care.86  Those 
concerns, however, all fall on the noncriminal side of the special needs 
binary, preventing S.G. from making those arguments without also 
attacking the special needs doctrine that had granted her victory in the 
Ninth Circuit.  Rather than argue those points, S.G. was forced to 
distinguish the motorist-witness case on other grounds:  the length and 
character of the seizure.87  These factors relate to the reasonableness of 
the seizure, an analysis that is only relevant when the special needs 
doctrine applies.88 
 Camreta next argued that states should be permitted to follow the 
“best practice” of interviewing potential child abuse victims in “a 
single joint interview with law enforcement and child-protective 
caseworkers present.”89  Joint interviews reflect the understanding that 
authorities can emotionally traumatize a child by forcing them to tell 
                                                 
 85. Id. at 19-21, 37-38 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004)).  The 
United States, as amicus curiae, similarly argued that absent a “serious threat of prolonged 
incarceration or other punishment,” S.G.’s seizure did not violate her Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011) (Nos. 09-1451 and 09-1478), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1454_PetitionerAmCuUS
A.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 86. Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663, 676-77 (2006). 
 87. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 55-56. 
 88. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 28-29. 
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and retell to multiple audiences how a close family member physically 
or sexually abused them.90  Such teams could also include expert 
forensic interviewers, whose involvement could prevent false 
allegations or doubtful statements that flow from poorly conducted 
interviews.91  But such multidisciplinary collaboration requires 
breaking down lines between law enforcement and other agencies—
the same lines that are bolstered by the special needs test.  Camreta’s 
brief left unclear exactly how the concern with higher-quality 
interviewers ought to fit into the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
 Like Camreta’s first argument, S.G. framed her presentation to 
the Court based on the special needs binary.  The first sentence in her 
Fourth Amendment argument emphasized the law enforcement 
entanglement, noting that this case involved “an armed, uniformed 
sheriff’s deputy.”92  S.G. focused on the extensive law enforcement 
entanglement in the particular search to argue against the special needs 
doctrine’s application.93 
 Several Justices’ questions during oral argument suggested some 
discomfort with the analysis created by this binary.  Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg asked, in essence, what was so special about a law 
enforcement purpose:  “Suppose we take the sheriff, deputy sheriff, 
out.  The only one who comes to the school and asks to talk to this 
child is the caseworker from the [child protection agency]?”94  
Counsel’s answer, taken straight from the special needs doctrine, was 
that “it would depend on . . . whether or not there was police 
entanglement.”95  This answer, though rooted in the Supreme Court’s 
own, oft-repeated holdings, provoked an extended dialogue, in which 
                                                 
 90. Accordingly, Congress has urged states to use multidisciplinary teams to 
investigate abuse allegations.  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011), cited in 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 28. 
 91. See Lindsay E. Cronch et al., Forensic Interviewing in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:  
Current Techniques and Future Directions, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 195, 196 
(2006) (noting that poorly conducted interviews can lead to false allegations).  That Camreta 
relied on this authority, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 29, is not without irony; Camreta 
and Alford did not interview S.G. through a multidisciplinary team or a trained forensic 
interviewer, and S.G. alleged that Camreta used precisely the kind of bad interviewing 
techniques that lead to false allegations.  Moreover, S.G. alleged that her mother would have 
consented—and, in fact, did consent (though Camreta and Alford did not act on her 
consent)—to an appropriate multidisciplinary interview, which would have made any Fourth 
Amendment issues moot.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 68-69. 
 92. Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 43. 
 93. Id. at 71-74. 
 94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) 
(Nos. 09-1454 and 09-1478). 
 95. Id. 
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Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, and Antonin Scalia proposed 
various hypotheticals suggesting that S.G.’s proposed test led to 
insupportable lines.96  A school nurse could likely take a child into their 
office, but S.G. argued that an outside official could not do so “to deal 
with situations that are not related to the school.”97  S.G. conceded that 
an outside nurse could bring the child to their office to address the 
child’s possible illness,98 leading to this ultimate question from Justice 
Scalia:  “[L]ikewise, it’s not a nurse, but it’s a social worker who’s 
brought in to interrogate the child about something else that is going to 
very much harm that child, why is that any different?”99  Counsel’s 
answer:  “Well, Your Honor, because child welfare investigations are 
also harmful to children.  And when—when a child is asked, 
interrogated about whether or not her father touches her 
inappropriately, that’s not a neutral action.  Whether or not she has 
been abused that causes trauma to the child.”100 
 The striking things about this dialogue are, first, how the Justices 
looked for a test other than law enforcement entanglement and, second, 
how nothing in the dialogue seemed to provide an adequate test.  
Counsel’s final answer that child welfare investigations are different 
because the investigations themselves harm children may be right.  But 
school disciplinary actions can also harm children.101  And the law 
generally views medical treatment for an illness (an example identified 
as acceptable by Justice Scalia and S.G.’s counsel) as an infringement 
on bodily integrity and thus a battery unless done with consent.102  Oral 
argument thus ended with several Justices hinting that the special 
needs framework may not suffice to answer Fourth Amendment 
questions in child protection cases and with the dialogue failing to 
identify satisfying alternative tests.  The Court declined to discuss 
these issues further, deciding the case on jurisdictional grounds.103 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 40-46. 
 97. Id. at 40-41. 
 98. Id. at 43. 
 99. Id. at 43-44. 
 100. Id. at 44. 
 101. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. SKIBA, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., ZERO EVIDENCE, ZERO 
TOLERANCE:  AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (2000), available at http:// 
www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf (criticizing strict disciplinary policies). 
 102. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:  DOCTRINE, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 710 (4th ed. 2010). 
 103. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 51. 
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D. Circuit Court Opinions in Other CPS Search and Seizure Cases 
Also Focus on the Special Needs Test 
 The Camreta litigants were not alone in their focus on law 
enforcement entanglement.  Synthesizing various circuit courts’ 
rulings in child protection cases, Wayne LaFave’s Fourth Amendment 
treatise focuses on the existence of any such entanglement.  When 
police are not included in the search, as they often are not, and when a 
child abuse investigation is “sufficiently disentangled from general law 
enforcement purposes,” then the “valid administrative purpose” of 
protecting children from abuse creates a special need justifying a lower 
standard than probable cause.104  Otherwise, they would not qualify for 
the lower standard applied via the special needs doctrine. 
 LaFave accurately accounts for how at least five circuit courts 
(including the Ninth Circuit, in Camreta and earlier decisions) have 
addressed these cases, with a particular focus on whether they fall on 
the special needs or normal law enforcement side of the special needs 
doctrine’s bright line.105  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit’s 2008 decision in Gates v. Texas Department of 
Protective and Regulatory Services illustrates the point.106  
Investigating allegations that Gary Gates physically abused some or all 
of his thirteen children, child protection investigators took several steps 
that involved law enforcement.  They took one child to a “child 
                                                 
 104. LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.3, at 106. 
 105. See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining why it 
would not apply T.L.O. to a child protective search). 
 106. 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008).  The Second Circuit has illustrated the same point, 
declaring a vaginal and anal examination of a five-year-old child that revealed no evidence of 
abuse unconstitutional because no special need existed in that particular case, though it 
suggested such a need might exist in a future case.  Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 
588-91, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1999) (summarizing the facts of the underlying search and seizure).  
So has the Seventh Circuit, applying T.L.O. to a child protection worker’s search of a child’s 
body for injuries on public school premises absent any law enforcement involvement or 
purpose.  Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900-02 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Jones v. Hunt, 
410 F.3d 1221, 1227-29 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing, but not deciding, whether T.L.O. 
applied because the alleged conduct would have violated any Fourth Amendment standard); 
J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting the special needs 
question, but concluding that probable cause existed and so the search was valid regardless of 
the doctrine’s application). 
 Tenenbaum received prominent discussion in a later edition of the seminal work, The 
Best Interests of the Child:  The Least Detrimental Alternative.  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:  THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996).  They 
conclude that Tenenbaum’s search and seizure “traumatized both [the daughter] and her 
parents” and had “no justification.”  Id. at 124.  Goldstein and his coauthors’ broader 
comments that suggest a significant change in child protection investigations are discussed 
infra note 307 and accompanying text. 
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advocacy center” interview that was witnessed by child protection and 
law enforcement authorities.107  They also searched the Gates’ family 
home with deputy sheriffs.108  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
search of the Gates’ home “was closely tied with law enforcement” 
and thus the special needs doctrine did not apply.109 
 The special needs doctrine’s current iteration has failed to lead to 
results that create clear rules or justifiable distinctions between the 
wide variety of child protection searches and seizures.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has distinguished 
between child protection searches and seizures that take place at public 
schools (and where authorities have a freer hand within the Seventh 
Circuit) and those at private schools.  Seventh Circuit cases have 
created that distinction without analyzing the law enforcement 
entanglement (or lack thereof).110  And in another setting, the Seventh 
Circuit has adjudicated a Fourth Amendment child protection case 
challenging state officials’ seizure of a child from his home without 
reference to its prior precedent or to the special needs doctrine.111  The 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits 
have explicitly left open the question of whether the special needs 
doctrine applies to any child protection searches, or only to those with 
law enforcement involvement.112 
E. Special Needs Doctrine’s Failure To Provide Satisfying Answers 
in Camreta and Other Child Protection Search and Seizure Cases 
 If courts followed the special needs doctrine in Camreta, they 
might reasonably reach the same results as the Ninth Circuit and 
several other circuit courts.  I agree with that result, but the reasoning 
would be unsatisfying.  It would vindicate S.G.’s claim based on a 
                                                 
 107. Gates, 537 F.3d at 413. 
 108. Id. at 414.  The sheriff’s office may also have been called because Texas law 
requires child protection authorities to notify law enforcement authorities of all child abuse 
reports and to engage law enforcement in a joint investigation of allegations of immediate 
risk of physical abuse—as was the case in this investigation.  Id. at 423 (citing TEX. FAM. 
CODE §§ 261.105(b), .301(f)). 
 109. Id. at 424.  In an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had held that Texas law entangled 
sex abuse investigations with law enforcement, even without law enforcement participation in 
a search, by requiring notification of cooperation with law enforcement for such 
investigations.  Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
 110. Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1009-12 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing a 
Fourth Amendment claim without reference to the special needs doctrine). 
 112. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999); J.B. v. Washington 
County, 127 F.3d 919, 919 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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factor—Alford’s involvement and presence—that was of little 
importance to S.G. herself.  It would fail to provide a meaningful 
analysis of a significant purpose of child protection searches and 
seizures:  investigative steps to determine if the state should infringe on 
the fundamental right of family integrity.  It would instead elevate the 
state’s law enforcement purpose above the civil child protection 
purpose despite the fact that both represent, as the Ninth Circuit noted, 
“governmental activity of the highest importance.”113  It would draw a 
line between those two highly important purposes when the current 
trend rightly seeks to merge those purposes into a united investigation 
to minimize the number of interviews of potential child victims.114  
And it would entirely ignore the millions of child protection 
investigations (probably the majority of such investigations) that lack a 
law enforcement component, yet implicate the same fundamental 
rights.  In so doing, it would lead to odd, if not perverse, results:  it 
would be easier for child protection authorities to invade family 
privacy to investigate allegations of neglect, which are the kind of 
allegations that do not trigger automatic requirements of reporting to 
law enforcement,115 than it would be to investigate allegations of more 
serious abuse.116 
 Applying the current special needs doctrine could also plausibly 
have led to a different result in Camreta.  As Camreta argued, S.G., and 
children in child protection investigations more generally, do not face 
criminal consequences, thus making them appear more like potential 
witnesses than targets of ordinary law enforcement activity.  This 
analysis might lead to a different result than the Ninth Circuit reached 
in Camreta, but would not change the result in child protection 
investigations of parents’ homes, as in Gates, where law enforcement 
was also involved in those searches.  This result, too, makes little 
sense.  It would unduly prioritize parents’ privacy interests over 
                                                 
 113. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d, 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. 
Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 114. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has suggested that avoiding duplicative interviews 
both reduces the risk of traumatizing children through forced discussions of potential abuse 
and improves the quality of interviews.  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Constitutional Rights 
of Parents and Children in Child Protective and Juvenile Delinquency Investigations 13 (Sept. 
28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934868. 
 115. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 116. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
801 (1994) (“If taken seriously, this [focus on criminal purpose] would mean that, as between 
two equally unintrusive but low-probability searches, the search justified by a more 
compelling purpose—criminal enforcement to protect person and property—is less 
constitutionally proper.”). 
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children’s, even though it is children who are at risk of being taken into 
state custody, and it would prioritize the potential criminal 
consequences for parents over the loss of their children to foster care. 
 Neither approach furthers sound analysis of child protection 
investigations.  Neither accounts for the immense family integrity 
interests at stake for both children and parents.  Neither incentivizes 
higher-quality interviews than those in Camreta by prioritizing high-
quality forensic interviewing techniques.  And neither requires child 
protection agencies to adjust their one-size-fits-all approach to 
investigations and to calibrate the level of investigation to the specific 
allegation and its credibility. 
III. SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE’S UNJUSTIFIED LINE AROUND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
 The difficulties apparent in Camreta and other child protection 
cases result directly from the special needs doctrine developed by the 
Supreme Court.  That doctrine requires one to discern the “primary . . . 
programmatic purpose”117 of a particular search and seizure:  “the 
normal need for law enforcement”118 or some other end.  This Part will 
explore how that binary developed without ever adequately justifying 
what distinguishes law enforcement searches and seizures from all 
other searches or seizures.  The absence of a law enforcement purpose 
links the various types of cases that fall under the special needs rubric:  
home safety inspections, suspicionless drug testing, school discipline 
searches, highway checkpoints, and others.119  That absence is the 
threshold criteria for all special needs cases, and, as such, the Court’s 
failure to provide some insight into it is glaring. 
 Despite failing to justify the bright line around law enforcement 
searches and seizures, the special needs case law provides some 
support for the reforms proposed in Part IV.  The case law focuses on 
the constitutional consequences that result from particular searches 
and seizures, which form one of the bases for the proposal to redraw 
the special needs’ bright line around all searches and seizures that 
threaten a significant invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.  
                                                 
 117. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001). 
 118. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 119. Different types of special needs cases do involve somewhat different analyses; for 
instance, executive branch discretion may be less concerning in a school discipline search, 
which depends on giving school officials discretion to respond to varied circumstances, than 
it is when applying a blanket drug test or checkpoint regime to all people meeting certain 
criteria.  Primus, supra note 14, at 271 (contrasting special subpopulation and dragnet 
searches). 
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And the case law does discuss the value of some limitation on 
government officials’ discretion, an important value that a reformed 
special needs doctrine should reflect. 
 This Part will trace the special needs doctrine from its origins in 
Camara v. Municipal Court through its naming in T.L.O. and its 
development in the quarter-century since, highlighting both the 
absence of a justification for the bright line around law enforcement 
searches and seizures and the presence of other themes relevant to a 
reformed doctrine. 
A. Origins:  Camara v. Municipal Court 
 A critical analysis of the Court’s first modern administrative 
search case, Camara, supports three points important to this Article’s 
argument.120  First, Camara demonstrates the importance of the 
constitutional consequences that result from a particular search or 
refusal to consent to such a search.  Second, Camara’s attempt to 
distinguish between criminal investigations and health and safety 
inspections shows the lack of a historical basis for a bright line around 
the former.  Third, Camara highlights the importance of evaluating 
executive discretion when determining whether a warrant is important, 
a key point missing from the current special needs doctrine. 
 Camara’s holding relates directly to the consequences of a 
proposed administrative search:  Roland Camara faced a criminal 
prosecution for refusing to permit a municipal employee to inspect his 
home for compliance with the local housing code.  The Supreme Court 
held that one could not be criminally punished for refusing to consent 
to a warrantless search of one’s home, a holding that followed the dicta 
of an earlier case, which indicated that “[t]he right to privacy in the 
home holds too high a place in our system of laws to justify” a 
criminal consequence for refusal to permit an administrative actor’s 
warrantless entry.121 
 Before reaching that conclusion, the Court analyzed how the 
proposed health and safety inspection might trigger different concerns 
than a criminal investigation, an analysis so muddled that it illustrates 
the absence of a principled line around law enforcement purposes.  
The Court first wrote as if it would deny the entire concept of 
administrative searches and treat them identically to criminal searches:  
“It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
                                                 
 120. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 121. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 7 (1950). 
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property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”122  But the Camara Court 
then significantly limited its holding, acknowledging the importance 
of such searches and that “routine periodic inspections of all 
structures” were necessary to enforce reasonable municipal regula-
tions.123  This necessity correlated to a relatively small privacy interest 
“because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the 
discovery of evidence of crime[;] they involve a relatively limited 
invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”124  Camara thus simultaneously 
suggests that the noncriminal purpose of a search does not justify 
diminishing Fourth Amendment protections and that a noncriminal 
purpose reduces the privacy interest to the point that individualized 
suspicion is not necessary, the seed of the doctrine later named 
“special needs.” 
 Camara overruled a 1959 health inspection case, Frank v. 
Maryland,125 and tried, unpersuasively, to rely on statements by the 
Frank majority and dissent to support a distinction between law 
enforcement and other types of searches.126  Although the Frank 
majority had suggested such a distinction,127 its view was overruled in 
Camara, and the Frank dissent (whose viewpoint became the majority 
viewpoint in Camara) merely said that the facts necessary to establish 
probable cause would differ in a health inspection case from those in a 
criminal investigation.128  The relevant sections of both the majority and 
dissent in Frank cited an earlier case,129  Boyd v. United States,130 but 
disputed its meaning.131  Boyd itself was ambiguous regarding which 
                                                 
 122. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. 
 123. Id. at 535-36. 
 124. Id. at 537. 
 125. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).  Frank held that a criminal conviction for refusing a 
warrantless health inspection of a home did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. at 373.  Camara explicitly overruled this holding.  387 U.S. at 528. 
 126. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38. 
 127. The Frank Court opined that “the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence 
of criminal acts” would “greatly hobble[]” health inspections.  359 U.S. at 372, quoted in 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. 
 128. Frank, 359 U.S. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting) quoted in Camara, 387 U.S. at 
538.  Justice William Douglas’s dissent also argued that the Fourth Amendment provides 
meaningful protections beyond criminal investigations, describing anything else as a 
“fallacy.”  Id. at 377. 
 129. Id. at 372-73 (majority opinion); id. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 130. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  Boyd referred to “official acts and proceedings” that 
triggered the warrant requirement.  Id. at 624. 
 131. The Frank majority distinguished “official acts and proceedings” from the health 
inspections at issue, 359 U.S. at 372-73 (majority opinion), while the dissent treated the 
 
 
 
 
382 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:353 
 
types of searches and seizures would trigger a warrant requirement.  
On one hand, Boyd applied the warrant and probable cause 
requirements to a civil case involving forfeiture of goods that the 
government alleged to have been imported without payment of the 
proper customs duty.132  On the other hand, the Boyd Court also 
discussed how the forfeiture proceeding, “though technically a civil 
proceeding, [was] in substance and effect a criminal one,” or at a least 
a “quasi criminal” one, because evidence justifying forfeiture would 
also have justified criminal sanctions for defrauding the government of 
revenue.133  Whatever lesson might be taken from Frank and Boyd, it is 
not, as Camara asserted, that a clear Fourth Amendment distinction 
exists between civil and criminal searches and seizures. 
 Camara did impose a warrant requirement for a reason that 
continues to resonate (even if the present special needs doctrine avoids 
it):  some check on executive branch discretion must exist to protect 
individual privacy, and only a warrant decision by a “disinterested 
party” could suffice.134  Limiting executive discretion is undoubtedly 
an essential purpose of the warrant requirement,135 and the Court 
discussed the level of discretion permitted by varying administrative 
schemes in a variety of cases decided in the fifteen years following 
Camara.136 
                                                                                                             
health inspection as precisely within the Boyd “official acts and proceedings” category, id. at 
383 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 132. The government had acted under a statute permitting it to obtain business records 
of importers as long as the demand occurred in “suits and proceedings other than criminal.”  
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619 (quoting Law of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187 (1874)).  This 
view of Boyd comports with the Framers’ concern about British “writs of assistance,” which 
permitted searches of any location without probable cause and without any criminal purpose.  
Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 115. 
 133. 116 U.S. at 634.  This language is also tied to the specific litigation purpose for 
which the government sought documents in Boyd:   the government filed a civil forfeiture 
suit, at least partly as a vehicle to demand production of documents regarding the items 
seized, that could have incriminated the individuals involved, thus raising Fifth Amendment 
concerns.  Id. at 634-35; see also id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring) (“[T]he effect of the act of 
Congress is to compel the party on whom the order of the court is served to be a witness 
against himself.”). 
 134. A government could obtain a warrant “if reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular 
dwelling.”  Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.  Schulhofer described this flexible standard as 
“antithetical to the traditional conception of ‘probable cause.’”  Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 
91; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33. 
 135. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 411 (1974). 
 136. These cases are discussed in some detail by Primus, supra note 14, at 268-70, and 
underscore the essential point from Camara :   that the level of discretion held by a 
government official under a particular statutory or regulatory scheme is important in 
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B. T.L.O. Special Needs Test 
 Eighteen years after Camara, Justice Harold Blackmun gave the 
special needs doctrine its name and stated the rule that would be 
applied in future cases in a concurring opinion in T.L.O:  “Only in 
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its 
balancing of interests for that of the Framers,”137 that is, to determine 
whether a search meets Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” 
standards rather than demand a warrant and probable cause.  T.L.O. 
upheld a high school assistant principal’s search of a fourteen-year-old 
student.  The decision (including Justice Blackmun’s concurrence) 
lauded school officials’ use of discretion, and thus broke with 
Camara’s focus on a warrant requirement as a check on executive 
branch discretion.  Justice Blackmun was also silent regarding the 
consequences of the challenged search.  Justice Blackmun was 
consistent with Camara on other central points:  he articulated a bright 
line between law enforcement purposes and all other purposes without 
any adequate justification.  He also articulated a test that has the 
potential to permit the modern administrative state’s operation and to 
prevent its less-invasive actions from providing cover for its more 
invasive actions. 
 In T.L.O., an assistant principal suspected T.L.O. of smoking a 
cigarette in the school bathroom, which was a violation of school rules, 
but not a crime.  He took T.L.O. to his office and searched her purse, 
finding both a pack of cigarettes and rolling papers.  Suspecting, based 
on the rolling papers, that her purse might contain more evidence of 
illegal drug possession, a crime, he searched further and found 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and documents implicating T.L.O. in 
drug dealing.  The assistant principal then turned the evidence over to 
the police.  The case reached the Supreme Court through litigation 
over T.L.O.’s motion to suppress the evidence found by the assistant 
principal in the state’s ensuing delinquency case against her.138  Finding 
a warrant requirement and probable cause inapplicable to searches 
                                                                                                             
determining whether a detached and neutral magistrate must issue a warrant.  See also 
Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 93-101 (summarizing developments in the law between Camara 
and T.L.O.). 
 137. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 329 (majority opinion). 
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motivated by school discipline, which required quick, flexible, and 
informal action, the Court approved the search.139 
 The most important difference between T.L.O. and Camara rests 
in their treatment of the warrant requirement.  While Camara looked to 
the warrant requirement as a means to limit executive branch officials’ 
discretion, T.L.O. saw it as an obstacle to the exercise of executive 
branch officials’ discretion in a situation where such discretion is 
important.140  The search of T.L.O.’s purse qualified as a special need 
beyond the need for law enforcement because it was incident to 
establishing discipline and maintaining order in schools, tasks which 
require immediate action and which a warrant requirement would 
impede, even though children did have some expectation of privacy at 
school.141  Although analysis of how an administrative scheme can 
cabin officials’ discretion and thus replace a judicial warrant continues 
in business regulation cases,142 T.L.O. represented a sharp shift in 
which limiting discretion no longer became a requirement of avoiding 
a warrant procedure. 
 But the special need of prompt school discipline only partly 
explains T.L.O.; the absence of a law enforcement purpose is equally 
important.  It is certainly true that the warrant requirement would 
interfere with school officials’ actions to enforce school rules.  But it 
also interferes with police officers’ criminal investigations—
                                                 
 139. Id. at 347-48. 
 140. See Primus, supra note 14, at 278 (describing dragnet searches as those that 
required some mechanism to “cabin[] executive discretion” and special subpopulation 
searches as those that “required that the Court give executive officials the discretion 
necessary to pick out certain individuals for differential treatment”). 
 141. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 338-41 
(majority opinion).  Primus categorizes T.L.O. as a special subpopulation search, because 
children at school have reduced expectations of privacy.  Primus, supra note 14, at 270-71.  
Indeed, the Court has sometimes suggested that children have less privacy rights at school.  
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) (“[W]hile children 
assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of 
those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.” (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. 
Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))).  Nonetheless, a generalization 
that T.L.O.’s holding applies equally to any search or seizure of a child at school, regardless of 
any connection to maintaining discipline, takes T.L.O. a step too far.  Henning, supra note 24, 
at 68-69.  The state officials pushed exactly that broad a generalization in Camreta, arguing 
that children’s lessened privacy in school justified the seizure of S.G.  Brief for Petitioner, 
supra note 67, at 30-34.  A child protection investigation does not fit well into T.L.O.’s focus 
on prompt discipline:  the investigation responds to out-of-school allegations, not to any 
student behavioral issues in school, and not to any curricular or pedagogic purposes. 
 142. E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).  Burger’s potential lessons for 
special needs cases are discussed more broadly infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text. 
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interference the law accepts.143  As important as public education is, it 
would be hard to argue that it is so much more important than public 
safety and criminal justice that it should be excepted from the Fourth 
Amendment limitations imposed on criminal investigations.  The 
difference between the two types of searches, therefore, rests on the 
level of intrusion into protected privacy interests.  And by the plain 
language of the special needs doctrine, it is not only the presence of a 
special need, but also the absence of a law enforcement purpose that 
establishes such a limited intrusion. 
 Like Camara, T.L.O. failed to explain what it is about normal law 
enforcement searches that makes them so special that only individuals 
subject to them should enjoy the fullest Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Justice Blackmun’s opinion identified non-law-
enforcement needs; his examples included the need to police the 
border and to ensure an officer’s safety during a Terry stop-and-frisk,144 
but did not justify the general rule.  His only reference to law 
enforcement’s special status is an oblique reference to Camara’s 
language about searches not “aimed at the discovery of evidence of 
crime.”145  Moreover, both Justice Blackmun’s concurrence and the 
plurality ignored the law enforcement consequence that actually 
resulted from the search:  a delinquency case against T.L.O.  The Court 
did not address whether the assistant principal intended to involve law 
enforcement at the time he extended his search or only decided to do 
so after completing the search.146  It is certainly plausible, if not likely, 
that when the assistant principal decided to search T.L.O.’s purse 
further, he did so intending to find evidence of a crime and turn it over 
to law enforcement, thus transforming the purpose of a search from a 
school discipline search to one that also had law enforcement 
purposes.  But the plurality simply concluded that the assistant 
principal had reasonable suspicion to search T.L.O.’s purse for more 
evidence of drugs, without considering whether that search had a law 
                                                 
 143. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 & n.12 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the “beneficent” law enforcement purpose is “immaterial” to the 
constitutionality of a warrantless wiretap and favorably quoting the argument that “it is better 
that a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people be exposed to the 
agents of the government”). 
 144. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352. 
 145. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).  Justice Blackmun cited the 
page of Camara, including the quoted language, without explanation as to what exactly on 
that page he relied upon.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice 
Blackmun’s text prior to this cite related to roving United States Border Patrol stops, which 
are not discussed in Camara.  Id. 
 146. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 101 (criticizing T.L.O. on similar grounds). 
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enforcement purpose.147  Justice Blackmun’s concurrence did not even 
address this issue.  T.L.O. thus left unexplored the question of how to 
determine the validity of a search that could have had both law 
enforcement and school disciplinary purposes, and at which point the 
latter serves as a subterfuge for the former—questions that have 
become more important as school discipline and law enforcement have 
become increasingly entangled.148 
C. Special Needs Test Applied 
 Since T.L.O., several developments have occurred.  First, the 
Supreme Court has applied the special needs test repeatedly, making it 
“the official formulation of the threshold inquiry” and essential to the 
results in administrative search cases.149  Second, the Supreme Court 
has refocused the special needs doctrine on the consequences that 
result from a particular search and seizure, and not simply the search 
and seizure itself.  The present special needs doctrine is best 
understood with this gloss on Justice Blackmun’s language:  the 
presence or absence of a law enforcement consequence to the 
individual who was searched or seized is highly relevant, and likely 
determinative, of whether a particular action qualifies as a special need 
or normal law enforcement search or seizure. 
 The Supreme Court has applied the T.L.O. concurrence’s test 
repeatedly in a range of administrative search cases.  In O’Connor v. 
Ortega, the Court addressed a state hospital’s search of the office of a 
doctor following allegations of financial mismanagement, but no 
element of the search was turned over to law enforcement authorities.150  
The search furthered the hospital’s needs as an employer, not its need 
to establish a criminal case, thus, with multiple cites to Justice 
Blackmun’s T.L.O. concurrence, the Court upheld the search.151  
Applying O’Connor’s analysis, City of Ontario v. Quon upheld a 
search of a public employee’s text messages sent on a government-
owned mobile device as part of an investigation into excess mobile 
charges and where the only consequence was job discipline.152  The 
Court also upheld blood and urine drug tests of railway employees for 
                                                 
 147. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347. 
 148. Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-
Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 295-96 (2004). 
 149. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 109; see also Primus, supra note 14, at 288 
(describing “extension” of the special needs test to dragnet cases). 
 150. 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987). 
 151. Id. at 720, 724-25. 
 152. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010). 
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the purpose of ensuring railway safety, relying on T.L.O.153  The Court 
similarly upheld urinalysis drug testing of customs employees in 
positions that involved access to drugs, firearms, or classified material, 
and where employees who tested positive could be fired, but would 
have faced no criminal consequences.154  Urinalysis of public high 
school students participating in athletics and other extracurricular 
organizations, where drug test results would lead to school 
consequences but no criminal or delinquency case, was similarly 
upheld, with the Supreme Court emphasizing the absence of law 
enforcement consequences.155 
 The Court’s application of the special needs test is generally 
outcome-determinative.  If a search or seizure serves a special need 
apart from ordinary law enforcement, the Court proceeds to balance an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy with the government’s 
and public’s interests in the challenged action.156  In practice, 
determining that a search serves a special need other than law 
enforcement nearly invariably leads to the conclusion that the search or 
seizure is reasonable.157  Conversely, when the Supreme Court has 
found that a challenged action has a law enforcement purpose, it has 
held that action to be a Fourth Amendment violation.158  When the 
Court has found a special need apart from ordinary law enforcement, it 
has upheld challenged searches and seizures.159  It took twenty-four 
years from the time T.L.O. was decided for the Court to provide an 
exception to this rule,160 holding in Safford Unified School District No. 
                                                 
 153. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citing Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring))). 
 154. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 662 (1989). 
 155. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829, 833-34 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651, 658 (1995). 
 156. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that only when special 
needs beyond law enforcement exist “is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests 
for that of the Framers”). 
 157. See Primus, supra note 14, at 257 (searches deemed special needs “are almost 
always deemed reasonable”). 
 158. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 
(2000). 
 159. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838; Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 662; 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48. 
 160. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), is not an exception to this rule, even 
though the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation in a case not involving a law 
enforcement search.  Id. at 323.  In Chandler, the Court held that a state law requiring 
candidates for certain offices to take a drug test violated their Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. 
at 322-23.  Although there was no contention that such searches served law enforcement 
needs—“the results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further 
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1 v. Redding that a strip search of a teenage girl, with no law 
enforcement purpose or consequence, violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights.161  But even Safford is not particularly strong; the Court claimed 
it simply applied T.L.O.’s balancing test, yet still found that qualified 
immunity protected the defendants, and so the teenager had no actual 
remedy.162 
 The two most important post-T.L.O. special needs cases, for this 
Article’s purposes, are Ferguson II 163 and Illinois v. Lidster.164  Both 
focus on the particular consequences of a challenged search or seizure 
to the individual searched or seized as the primary means of applying 
the special needs test.  Ferguson II involved drug tests designed to 
protect children from prenatal drug exposure.  In 1989, a task force 
including a South Carolina public hospital, local police, the county 
Substance Abuse Commission, and the Department of Social Services 
developed a policy for testing women for substance abuse during 
pregnancy and immediately after childbirth.165  Hospital staff would 
notify police of positive drug tests, and arrest and prosecution would 
soon follow.166  Involved staff would follow chain-of-custody 
procedures, “presumably to make sure that the results could be used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.”167 
 The challenged policy also allowed information to be shared with 
child protection authorities, although the Court did not note this fact.  
Hospital officials disclosed the results of drug tests with an 
interdisciplinary group that met at the hospital for Suspected Child 
Abuse and Neglect (SCAN) meetings that included the Department of 
                                                                                                             
dissemination of the report”—the Court found that no special need existed.  Id. at 318, 322.  
Without evidence of an actual problem of drug users holding particular offices, the Court 
found that the state’s proffered need was not “important enough” to qualify as a special need.  
Id. at 318.  Chandler thus stands for the proposition, tangential to this Article, that a special 
need must indeed be special.  Id. 
 161. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 162. Barry Feld describes Safford as a “fact-specific limited right without any 
practical remedy,” not a significant challenge to the rule.  Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s 
Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions:  Few Rights and Fewer 
Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 870 (2011). 
 163. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 164. 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 165. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. at 70-71. 
 166. Id. at 72 & n.5.  The hospital soon adjusted its procedures:  after a first positive 
drug test, women could avoid police involvement by consenting to substance abuse treatment.  
A second positive drug test would trigger police notification.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 71-72. 
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Social Services.168  The hospital informed women who tested positive 
upon birth that “a referral had been made to the Department of Social 
Services.”169  A hospital letter to patients summarized its policy and 
listed the police, prosecutors, child protection authorities, and others 
who would be involved if women did not obtain treatment.170  But these 
facts did not feature prominently in the Ferguson II litigation, which 
focused instead on the role of law enforcement and ignored child 
protection, starting with the district court’s jury instructions.171  The 
circuit court’s first opinion did not even address the child protection 
agency’s involvement,172 and its second opinion (on remand from the 
Supreme Court) summarized the facts of each case without 
mentioning the child protection agency’s involvement.173  Indeed, it 
appears, from the reported decisions, that the plaintiffs never 
challenged the sharing of information with child protection authorities.  
This entirely understandable litigation choice demonstrates how the 
special needs test’s line around law enforcement searches has 
hardened, shaping litigation to focus on that line. 
 Ferguson II is particularly important for three reasons.  First, it 
demonstrates how the special needs doctrine draws lines between law 
enforcement and other severe consequences.  If the hospital had 
created a policy to turn positive drug tests over to child protection 
authorities with the same chain-of-custody procedures and if the child 
protection authorities removed the children, the doctrine, in its current 
form, does not suggest a Fourth Amendment violation would have 
occurred.  Ferguson II thus highlights a core task for anyone seeking to 
justify the special needs doctrine:  explaining why an arrest is a more 
severe consequence than losing one’s child immediately after birth or, 
from the child’s perspective, being placed in state custody.  Ferguson II 
did not attempt this task. 
                                                 
 168. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936), 
available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Petitioners 
%20Supreme%20Court%20Brief.pdf. 
 169. Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson III ) , 308 F.3d 380, 389 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 170. Id. at 388. 
 171. The district court’s jury instruction, for instance, included the statement, “But 
what makes this case unusual and what brings it within the coverage of the Fourth 
Amendment is the fact that you have law enforcement and medical service people acting 
together.”  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 168, at 5 (quoting the district court’s jury 
instruction (emphasis added)); see also Ferguson III, 308 F.3d at 393 (summarizing the 
district court’s decision as “reject[ing] the special needs theory” because of law enforcement 
entanglement). 
 172. Ferguson v. City of Charleston (Ferguson I ) , 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 173. Ferguson III, 308 F.3d at 390-93. 
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 Second, it clarified doctrinally that one should look to the 
“primary” and “programmatic” purpose of a particular search.174  This 
programmatic inquiry focuses on policies, not the subjective intent of 
individuals involved in a particular search, and thus creates a legal 
incentive to develop policies that avoid excessive entanglement 
between a legitimate special need and law enforcement.175  The Court 
identified a law enforcement policy that was not based on the details of 
the actual search itself, which looked like any mundane hospital blood 
draw or urine test.  Rather, the purpose was evident in the use of the 
fruits of that search, which the hospital promptly turned over to police, 
and the reasonably expected consequences of that decision.176 
 Third, Ferguson II demonstrates the special needs test’s ability to 
preserve important constitutional rights in the face of political 
pressure.  The hospital’s actions arose in a particular social and 
political context:  “[T]he problem of ‘crack babies’ was widely 
perceived in the late 1980[s] as a national epidemic, prompting 
considerable concern both in the medical community and among the 
general populace.”177  The Court did not note that the most widespread 
legal effect of society’s concern about women exposing developing 
fetuses to crack cocaine was in child welfare.  The foster care 
population swelled as child protection agencies responded to increased 
use of crack cocaine in those years.  Removals of children born to 
substance-abusing mothers formed a hugely disproportionate amount 
of this increase; removals of infants increased 89% in New York and 
58% in Illinois over three years, and most of those removals occurred 
“within days following birth.”178  Subsequent longitudinal studies 
express significant doubt regarding the wisdom of these removals.  
Cocaine use during pregnancy is undeniably bad (although less severe 
than feared in the 1980s and 1990s), with increased risks of attention 
and self-regulation problems, but no significant effects on a child’s 
                                                 
 174. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001). 
 175. See infra notes 237-249 and accompanying text. 
 176. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. at 84-85.  This feature of Ferguson II also evokes some of 
the most powerful language of Boyd—the case relied upon in Frank and, by extension, in 
Camara.  See discussion supra notes 120-134.  Boyd found a Fourth Amendment violation 
even without authorities conducting a physical search:  “It is not the breaking of his doors, 
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property 
. . . .”  116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 177. 532 U.S. at 70 n.1. 
 178. Eugene M. Lewit, Child Indicators:  Children in Foster Care, 3 FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 192, 196-98 (1993), available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/ 
publications/docs/03_03_Indicators.pdf. 
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physical growth, developmental test scores, or language outcomes.179  
Moreover, rather than removing infants exposed to drugs in utero by 
their mothers, at least one child protection system has placed such 
cases on a differential response track, in which the family is not even 
investigated nor generally subject to a finding of neglect that could 
lead to a removal.180 
 Lidster is important for a different reason:  it focuses on a law 
enforcement consequence to the individual searched or seized, and 
was thus relied upon by the state officials in Camreta.181  Lidster upheld 
the use of a highway checkpoint with which police stopped cars at the 
same location and time of day as a fatal hit-and-run that had occurred 
several days prior.  Police asked motorists if they had witnessed the 
crime, but did not expect to stop the culprit.  The police officers’ goal, 
to catch a criminal distinct from the individuals seized at the 
checkpoint, distinguished Lidster from a highway checkpoint designed 
“to look for evidence of drug crimes committed by occupants of those 
vehicles,” which the Court had ruled unconstitutional.182  Even the 
Lidster dissent recognized the “valid and important distinction 
between seizing a person to determine whether she has committed a 
crime and seizing a person to ask whether she has any information 
about an unknown person who committed a crime a week earlier.”183 
                                                 
 179. These conclusions are from a 2010 review of multiple studies on the effect of in 
utero cocaine exposure on children’s first six years of life.  John P. Ackerman et al., A Review 
of the Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure Among School-Aged Children, 125 PEDIATRICS 
554, 554 (2010), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/125/3/554.full.html; 
see also Susan Okie, Encouraging New on [sic] Babies Born to Cocaine-Abusing Mothers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/americas/27iht-coca.3. 
19716510.html (summarizing recent research on the harm of in utero cocaine exposure and 
the comparative harms of in utero alcohol and tobacco exposure). 
 180. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:  WORKING AS ONE TO KEEP 
THE DISTRICT’S CHILDREN SAFE 14 (2011) (listing “newborn positive toxicology” as a 
category of cases eligible for a “family assessment” rather than an investigation) (on file with 
author). 
 181. Supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 182. 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (“The stop’s primary law enforcement purpose was not 
to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle 
occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in 
all likelihood committed by others.”).  The prior case was City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32 (2000).  Four highway checkpoint cases are discussed infra notes 222-224 and 
accompanying text. 
 183. 540 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
John Paul Stevens dissented in part because he concluded that the search was unreasonable, 
an analysis entered only after the Court applied the special needs doctrine.  Id. 
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 The Lidster Court thus applied the special needs doctrine despite 
an undisputed law enforcement purpose.184  The essential gloss is that 
the special needs test looks for state action that identifies the individual 
searched or seized as the target of a criminal investigation.  This gloss 
is not readily apparent in the special needs language from T.L.O. and 
subsequent cases, but that may simply reflect the reality that in all of 
those cases, the individual searched or seized was the individual who 
bore the consequences (criminal or otherwise) of those searches and 
seizures.  Until Lidster, the Court did not have the opportunity or need 
to decide how to apply the special needs test when the individual 
searched or seized was not a criminal target.185 
D. Boundaries of the Special Needs Doctrine 
 Clearly defining what qualifies as a special needs case and what 
qualifies as a case considering some other warrant and probable cause 
exception is essential for various reasons.  Mixing together different 
categories of administrative search cases can lead not only to confused 
analysis, but to the erosion of important Fourth Amendment 
safeguards.186  It is thus important to treat searches that have a law 
enforcement purpose regarding the individual searched, yet which do 
not trigger the warrant and probable cause requirements, as something 
other than a special needs search.187 
 Recent Supreme Court cases suggest clearer boundaries around 
the special needs doctrine, by delineating other doctrines that exempt 
certain state action from warrant and probable cause requirements and 
                                                 
 184. Lidster did not use the phrase “special needs,” so one can question whether it is a 
true special needs case.  See infra Part III.D.  But it relied heavily on Edmond.  See Lidster, 
540 U.S. at 423-24, 426-27 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35, 40-41, 44).  Edmond was framed 
as a special needs case that sought to discern the traffic stops’ “primary purpose.”  531 U.S. at 
40, 44. 
 185. Primus has criticized Lidster for failing to discuss the level of executive discretion 
at issue when the officials decided to set up the specific roadblock and selected the particular 
time and location they did, thus failing to consider the core purpose of the warrant 
requirement as identified in Camara.  Primus, supra note 14, at 282.  But if the Court is right 
that seizures that are limited to eliciting witness statements do not significantly invade 
privacy, at least when the seizure is brief and minimally invasive (as in Lidster), then checking 
executive branch discretion is of much less importance; checking discretion to invade 
individual privacy more significantly is a greater value. 
 186. See id. at 277-301 (arguing that conflation of dragnet and special subpopulation 
cases has led to a weakening of protections in both categories). 
 187. See Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists:  Why Public Safety Is Not a Special 
Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 849 (2010) (describing law enforcement searches as those “that 
cannot be justified by the special needs doctrine”).  Simmons also persuasively argues why 
suspicionless antiterrorism searches—like those at airports, public buildings, and 
elsewhere—cannot be justified by a special needs analysis.  Id. at 887-93. 
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by analyzing searches with law enforcement purposes directed at the 
individual searched under a reasonableness framework.  The Court has 
found a set of searches targeting individuals with such reduced 
expectations of privacy that are permissible without a warrant or 
probable cause.  The most recent and most clearly articulated example 
is Samson v. California, in which the Court upheld suspicionless and 
warrantless searches and seizures of state parolees; the opinion makes 
no effort to present the searches as justified by a special need beyond 
law enforcement and did not pretend the searches served any purpose 
other than ensuring criminal convicts had not slid into recidivism upon 
their parole.188  Similarly, the Court in United States v. Knights upheld 
a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment, with explicit 
consideration of the state’s “interest in apprehending violators of the 
criminal law,” given the high recidivism rate of probationers.189 
 One can question the results and analysis in Samson and Knights, 
but at least the Court did not push them into the boundaries of the 
special needs doctrine, thus avoiding the intellectual contortions of 
earlier cases.190  Two cases decided one week apart in 1987 confused 
the line between special needs and reduced privacy cases.  In Griffin v. 
Wisconsin,191 from which Knights and Samson trace their lineage,192 the 
                                                 
 188. 547 U.S. 843, 847, 855 n.4 (2006); see also id. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify the search of petitioner on ‘special 
needs’ grounds.”). 
 189. 534 U.S. 112, 118, 121 (2001).  One factual distinction may explain the 
unanimity of the Knights Court:  reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause) existed to 
search Knights’ apartment.  Id. at 116.  The Samson dissenters focused on this difference:  
they would have permitted the warrantless search in Knights on reasonable suspicion, but 
prohibited the warrantless search in Samson because it lacked any individual suspicion.  
Samson, 547 U.S. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The difference goes to a “reasonableness” 
analysis—whether some individualized suspicion should be necessary to render the search 
reasonable—which is a debate beyond the scope of this Article. 
 190. Many have questioned Samson and Knights.  E.g., Robert Cacace, Samson v. 
California:  Tearing Down a Pillar of Fourth Amendment Protections, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 223 (2007); Primus, supra note 14, at 296-97, 308 (criticizing Samson for not applying 
the special needs doctrine); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness:  Saving the 
Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2008) (criticizing 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” cases). 
 191. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).  In his Ferguson II dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia cited 
Griffin for the proposition that “the special-needs doctrine was developed, and is ordinarily 
employed, precisely to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of course, 
ordinarily have a law enforcement objective.”  532 U.S. 67, 100 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
The majority appropriately focused the special needs doctrine on law enforcement purposes 
and entanglement.  Id. at 79 n.15 (majority opinion). 
 192. Knights twice cited Griffin to support its reasonableness analysis.  Knights, 534 
U.S. at 117-20.  Samson cited Griffin in support of its reasonableness analysis.  Samson, 547 
U.S. at 848-49, 854. 
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Court upheld a warrantless search of a probationer’s home, holding 
that probation presented a special need beyond normal law 
enforcement.193  The majority weakly argued that supervision 
(including warrantless searches) of probationers helped ensure their 
reentry into society without harming society via recidivism.194  The 
Court similarly squeezed a different type of search into the special 
needs box in New York v. Burger, upholding a warrantless and 
suspicionless search of an automobile junkyard.195  The “ultimate 
purpose” of the search was, undeniably, to deter and catch criminal 
behavior (specifically, the frequent use of automobile junkyards to 
hide stolen cars and parts), yet the Court described it as another 
situation of special need.196  Tellingly, the Court omitted the second half 
of the special needs test:  whether the special need was beyond that of 
ordinary law enforcement.197  Some more recent lower court cases 
addressing DNA testing of criminal convicts also reflect the weak 
arguments that come from trying to squeeze searches designed to 
gather evidence of crimes committed by the individuals searched into a 
special needs analysis.198 
E. What Makes Law Enforcement Purposes So Important? 
 The presence of ordinary law enforcement needs defines the line 
between special needs and other searches.  But T.L.O. did not explain 
what was so special about law enforcement purposes that they, but 
nothing else, should be exempt from special needs treatment.199  
Camara suggested, but did not support, such a distinction.200  A 
justification for treating law enforcement, and only law enforcement, 
differently remains necessary. 
                                                 
 193. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874. 
 194. Id. at 875. 
 195. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).  The bulk of Burger explained the Court’s ruling that the 
search could occur because automobile junkyards were a “pervasively regulated industr[y],” 
id. at 693, in which business owners’ reasonable expectation of privacy is reduced, id. at 700-
01. 
 196. Id. at 693, 702; see also id. at 708 (“[M]otor vehicle theft has increased in the 
State and . . . the problem of theft is associated with this industry.”).  Schulhofer aptly 
explained this flaw in Burger.  Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 103. 
 197. I do not suggest that Burger is unimportant to the special needs doctrine.  Once 
the Court applied the special needs doctrine to Burger—however flawed that decision may 
have been—the Court embarked on an important discussion of when an administrative 
scheme can adequately cabin officials’ discretion and replace a warrant procedure.  Infra 
notes 233-235 and accompanying text. 
 198. Infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text. 
 199. Supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. 
 200. See cases cited supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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 Later Supreme Court cases have briefly discussed factors that 
might explain what makes law enforcement searches so different.  But 
none are satisfying.201  First, O’Connor noted that supervisors in 
government agencies should focus on running an efficient government 
office and, unlike police officers, should not “learn the subtleties of the 
probable cause standard.”202  Indeed, many state actors have far less 
interaction with the justice system than police officers and, one may 
argue, should not face the same restrictions on their behavior.203  One 
circuit court evoked this concern when, citing O’Connor, it wrote: 
If forcing a non law-enforcement government officer to follow ordinary 
law-enforcement requirements under the Fourth Amendment would 
impose intolerable burdens on the officer or the courts, would prevent 
the officer from taking necessary action, or tend to render such action 
ineffective, the government officer may be . . . subjected to less 
stringent reasonableness requirements instead [of probable cause and 
warrant requirements].204 
This concern does not recognize that many state actors, such as child 
protection officials, are, like police officers, frequently involved in 
court or other legal proceedings and can be fairly expected to 
understand legal concepts.  And any state official implementing a 
regulatory scheme should understand the legal issues that arise in the 
course of that implementation.  Moreover, the O’Connor argument 
does not justify what the T.L.O. test did in that case:  impose a 
reasonable suspicion standard on school searches, which still requires 
teachers and administrators to understand the subtleties of a Fourth 
Amendment concept. 
 Second, Justice Lewis Franklin Powell’s T.L.O. concurrence 
suggests that law enforcement officials have an inherently 
“adversarial” relationship with criminal suspects, unlike the 
relationship school officials have with students.205  That distinction may 
have surprised T.L.O., who would likely have characterized her 
relationship with the assistant principal who searched her purse and 
                                                 
 201. Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 114 (“Unfortunately, Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence and the Court opinions based on it never attempt to justify the permissive side of 
his test. . . .  And [later cases] cited his formulation as one already accepted and in no need of 
defense.”). 
 202. 480 U.S. 709, 724-25 (1987). 
 203. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(noting that teachers should not be expected to determine the existence of probable cause 
quickly). 
 204. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 205. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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turned her over to the police as adversarial.206  The point is even weaker 
when applied to child protection searches.  Just as police “have the 
responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those 
who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of 
such persons to trial,”207 child protection investigators have the 
responsibility to investigate child abuse and neglect, locate abusive and 
neglectful parents, remove abused and neglected children from those 
parents, and facilitate legal proceedings to effectuate such removals.  
Child protection investigations are inherently adversarial to parents and 
to children who do not want protection from the state.208 
 Third, the Court has suggested that the probable cause 
requirement is “rooted . . . in the criminal investigatory context.”209  But 
the authorities relied on for this assertion focus less on anything unique 
to criminal investigations and more on the distinction between 
individualized investigations and “routine administrative caretaking 
functions,”210 a reference that evokes standardized, discretionless 
                                                 
 206. The Ninth Circuit similarly described the relationship between network 
administrators and network users as nonadversarial.  United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 
1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring)).  But, 
as in T.L.O., the facts seem adversarial:  a network administrator played a cat-and-mouse 
game with a hacker and, upon identifying the suspect, searched his computer to determine if 
he had hacked into the university’s server and committed a federal crime.  Id. at 1143-45. 
 207. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349. 
 208. In the federal government’s terms, investigations have an “adversarial 
orientation.”  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL 
RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 6 (2008), available at http://www. 
childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/differential_response/differential_response.pdf; see also 
HARVEY SCHWEITZER & JUDITH LARSEN, FOSTER CARE LAW:  A PRIMER 65 (2005) (stating 
that child protection investigation “is most often adversarial rather than cooperative”).  The 
issue of a child who wishes to speak with authorities is discussed infra notes 344-345 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989); O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987). 
 210. Both O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723, and Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667, cite Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), which, in turn, relies on a footnote in South Dakota v. 
Opperman.  Opperman states:  “The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to 
criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures. . . .  The probable-cause 
approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine 
administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective 
procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.”  428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976) 
(citation omitted).  Bertine, like Opperman, involved a police inventory search of automobiles 
(searches governed by a separate category of Fourth Amendment law) that provided no 
occasion to address a nonroutine, noninventory search or seizure implicating an important 
constitutional right other than the various rights associated with criminal procedure.  Bertine, 
479 U.S. at 369.  Bertine also cited a footnote in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977), that is even less relevant to the special needs doctrine.  Bertine, 476 U.S. at 371 
(citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 n.5).  The Chadwick footnote simply notes the Opperman 
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searches like those at border checkpoints or airports and says nothing 
about “noncriminal” investigations, which are anything but routine and 
which implicate important constitutional rights.  The Court might have 
cited Cady v. Dombrowski, which recognized a “community 
caretaking” exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, 
when a search or seizure is “totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute.”211  Cady’s language is roughly analogous to the 
special needs doctrine.212  But Cady, too, offers little explanation, 
offering no citation for its “totally divorced” language.213  In context, 
Cady’s language merely explains that local law enforcement officers 
have frequent contact with automobiles for a variety of noncriminal 
purposes:  enforcement of traffic, parking, and vehicle safety laws.  
Cady does not explain why a bright line exists between criminal and 
noncriminal purposes.214  Then again, like early special needs cases, 
Cady did not deal with noncriminal searches or seizures that implicate 
important constitutional rights. 
 Fourth, Justice Stephen Breyer suggested in Lidster that searches 
or seizures that place the individual searched or seized at risk of arrest 
and prosecution are particularly likely “to provoke anxiety or to prove 
intrusive.”215  Justice Breyer distinguished highway checkpoints designed 
to identify, stop, and punish criminal drug activity from “information-
seeking” stops designed to ask the public for “help in providing 
information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.”216  
On one hand, Justice Breyer’s focus on the likely consequence to the 
individual searched or seized is an essential element of a more 
analytically sound special needs doctrine, as argued in Part IV.B.  But 
                                                                                                             
holding regarding police inventory searches and states “the salutary functions of a warrant 
simply have no application in that context.”  Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10 n.5. 
 211. 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
 212. For a comparison of the community caretaking and special needs doctrines, see 
Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism:  Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, 
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1519-27 (2009).  In 
addition, Opperman—the ultimate source of the Court’s assertion that the warrant 
requirement is “rooted” in criminal investigations—cited Cady multiple times.  428 U.S. at 
367, 368, 369 n.4, 374-76, 376 n.10 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. 433).  Opperman particularly 
focused on Cady’s description of “noncriminal in nature” contact between police and 
individuals.  Id. at 368. 
 213. 413 U.S. at 441. 
 214. Justice William Brennan made this point in his Cady dissent, arguing that the 
Fourth Amendment applies both when an individual is a criminal suspect and when they are 
not.  Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 215. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004). 
 216. Id. at 423-24. 
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on the other hand, this focus says nothing about why law enforcement 
searches, in particular, should be treated differently.  In Camreta, a 
seizure “provoke[d] anxiety” and “prove[d] intrusive” because of the 
civil consequences to a child’s home life (she was removed from her 
parents’ custody for several weeks) rather than because of any criminal 
consequence to the child.217 
 In sum, in the twenty-seven years since T.L.O. and the forty-five 
years since Camara, the Supreme Court has offered no sufficient 
explanation of what makes law enforcement purposes or entanglement 
so important that it distinguishes special needs searches and seizures 
from those that will trigger the warrant and probable cause 
requirements.  As Akhil Amar wrote, the Supreme Court’s criminal 
versus other searches distinction provides “no answer.”218 
F. Concluding Synthesis 
 The special needs doctrine is now a well-established element of 
Fourth Amendment law, directing courts and litigants to analyze 
whether a particular search falls on the law enforcement or non-law-
enforcement side of the doctrine’s bright line.  Despite its frequent 
application, the doctrine remains without any adequate justification for 
drawing this bright line where it does.  In addition, since T.L.O., it has 
lost its focus on the reasons noted in Camara and other cases for why 
the warrant requirement exists (cabining executive branch officials’ 
discretion).  As discussed in Part II, these faults are on vivid display in 
Camreta and other child protection cases, which involve state action 
which implicates civil, but fundamental, rights and which involves 
significant discretion. 
 The doctrine’s evolution, however, contains two themes that are 
highly relevant to a reformed and more coherent doctrine for the 
future.  First, the special needs doctrine focuses on the intended and 
reasonably foreseen consequences to the individual searched or seized; 
those consequences are a primary mechanism for determining on 
which side of the doctrine’s bright line a particular case falls.  Second, 
the doctrine now focuses on the programmatic or policy purpose of a 
search or seizure, suggesting a focus on how the doctrine can shape 
governments’ policy choices. 
                                                 
 217. Id. at 425; supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
 218. Amar, supra note 116, at 770 (“The unsupported idea that the ‘core’ of the 
[Fourth] Amendment is somehow uniquely or specially concerned with criminal law is 
simply an unfortunate artifact . . . .”). 
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IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED SPECIAL NEEDS TEST 
 The Supreme Court should reform the existing special needs 
binary to protect individuals from warrantless searches and seizures 
that implicate fundamental constitutional rights.  The current doctrine’s 
valuation of law enforcement purposes above all others has never been 
adequately justified.  The test’s application to child protection searches 
and seizures illustrates its limitations and lack of theoretical 
grounding.  This Part will outline steps toward an improved special 
needs test.  It will first describe the values embedded in the Court’s 
formulation.  It will then describe how a reformed test that better 
accounts for those values can lead to better results and sounder 
analysis. 
A. Special Needs Test’s Value 
 One can reasonably question whether the Supreme Court ought 
to jettison the special needs test entirely:  after all, the Fourth 
Amendment’s text says nothing about the particular type of search nor 
suggests in any way that a search by a police officer ought to be treated 
differently than a search by a social worker or health inspector.219  I do 
not share this view.  The special needs test has the potential to allow 
the Fourth Amendment to regulate meaningfully and rationally the 
wide variety of searches and seizures performed by the modern 
administrative state and the different privacy interests those actions 
involve.  The test reflects three important values. 
 First, drawing a bright line recognizes that many administrative 
searches involve minimal privacy intrusions while providing important 
social benefits and permits those to occur without allowing them to 
serve as cover for more invasive government action.  Camara dealt 
with a housing code search, and the Court acknowledged the 
“vigorous” case “that the health and safety of entire urban populations 
is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and 
sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing 
such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical 
structures.”220  Modern constitutional law respects this role of 
                                                 
 219. See id. at 758 (describing as false Fourth Amendment case law’s distinction 
between criminal and civil purposes because the Amendment’s text “applies equally to civil 
and criminal law enforcement” and “[i]ts history is not uniquely bound up with criminal 
law”). 
 220. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).  An earlier case, not decided on 
constitutional grounds, addressed health department inspections.  District of Columbia v. 
Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). 
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government, and the special needs doctrine protects that role from 
overly burdensome Fourth Amendment regulation.  Accordingly, 
Camara acknowledged that the warrant requirement may be 
inappropriate if “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate 
the governmental purpose behind the search,” a theme reiterated by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts.221 
 Conversely, the special needs test also provides a mechanism to 
ferret out administrative searches used as subterfuge for criminal 
investigations, and the Supreme Court’s record shows the promise of 
enforcing a line between true special needs and something else.  
Ferguson II aptly demonstrates the Court’s ability to enforce the line.  
But it is not the only case.  In a series of highway checkpoint cases, the 
Court has distinguished between those with a primary purpose of 
“general . . . crime control” and those focusing on “roadway safety.”222  
A highway checkpoint with the “primary purpose of interdicting 
illegal narcotics” does not qualify for the special needs doctrine,223 
while a “sobriety checkpoint” to take drunk drivers off the road, and 
thus prevent accidents in the immediate future, does.224  In analogous 
areas, state courts have distinguished between police who entered a 
home to determine if unconscious individuals had overdosed on drugs 
and needed medical attention from police who seized a teenager in no 
                                                 
 221. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533; see also, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721 
(1987); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978) (discussing a potential warrant 
requirement’s burden on the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s entire regulatory scheme); 
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If forcing a non law-enforcement 
government officer to follow ordinary law-enforcement requirements under the Fourth 
Amendment would impose intolerable burdens on the officer or the courts, would prevent the 
officer from taking necessary action, or tend to render such action ineffective, the government 
officer may be relieved of those requirements and subjected to less stringent reasonableness 
requirements instead.”). 
 222. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979). 
 223. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). 
 224. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).  Sitz is not directly 
framed as a special needs decision.  In response to plaintiffs’ argument that there was no 
special need beyond law enforcement because drunk drivers were not only taken off of the 
road but arrested and charged with driving under the influence, the Court said that a separate 
body of “prior cases dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways” governed, 
and that those cases permitted a balancing test.  Id. at 450.  That statement was somewhat odd 
since Justice Blackmun had cited some of those highway stop cases in his T.L.O. special 
needs opinion.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Birgnoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).  Regardless, the result is the same as it would have been if the 
Court had explicitly found a special need.  (The Court went on to apply a balancing test to 
determine if the stops were reasonable). 
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obvious distress whom they suspected of drug involvement.225  One 
need not agree with the precise lines courts have drawn (for instance, 
one can question whether a sobriety checkpoint designed both to take 
drunk drivers off the road and to arrest and charge them with driving 
under the influence ought to qualify for the special needs doctrine) to 
recognize that the line exists and thereby provides some meaningful 
protection of Fourth Amendment interests. 
 I acknowledge that the Court’s record in policing against 
subterfuge is imperfect.  Justice Blackmun, the original author of the 
special needs test, was rightly criticized in Burger for applying a 
special needs framework to a search designed to determine if a 
vehicle-dismantling business possessed stolen property.226  Other courts 
have engaged in some intellectual contortions to fit a particular search 
on the special needs, and not ordinary law enforcement, side of the 
line.  For instance, a Ninth Circuit panel held that the search of a 
computer that was suspected to have been the source of recent and 
potentially ongoing hacking into a public university’s network was 
justified by the special needs doctrine.227  The search was done in 
consultation with police officers to protect the university’s server and 
network from the effects of a federal crime (recklessly causing damage 
by intentionally accessing a protected computer without 
authorization).228  Distinguishing a search conducted in consultation 
with law enforcement to prevent or interrupt an ongoing crime from a 
search for ordinary law enforcement purposes is far too fine a 
distinction. 
 Courts’ difficulty in enforcing the line between true special needs 
cases and law enforcement searches and seizures arises with greater 
frequency when courts do not respect the boundaries of the special 
needs doctrine discussed above.229  That was the case in Burger, which 
was largely decided based on the reduced expectation of privacy held 
                                                 
 225. Compare State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 2010) (finding that officers 
were engaged in a community-care function because they had received a tip about someone 
sleeping next to drugs, arrived to find the front door open, and knocked and received no 
response before entering), with State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (finding 
that officers were reasonable in approaching a small, teenage girl in a high-narcotics area to 
determine whether she was at risk but had no right to seize her when she tried to walk away). 
 226. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Whether 
Justice Blackmun’s point that a “closely regulated” business had a reduced expectation of 
privacy justifying a warrantless search is valid, apart from his misapplication of his own 
special needs framework, is a point beyond the scope of this Article.  Id. at 613-14. 
 227. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 228. Id. at 1144-46 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)). 
 229. Supra Part III.D. 
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by a “closely regulated” business.230  Lower court cases showing 
difficulty policing the special needs line similarly confuse reduced 
privacy cases with special needs cases.  One Ninth Circuit judge, 
echoing several circuit courts, has written that extracting DNA from 
convicted criminals counts as a special need when done to aid the 
offender’s “rehabilitation through deterrence,” even if that action will, 
“of course[,] aid in catching him” if said rehabilitation fails.231  A later 
Ninth Circuit opinion held that taking a convict’s DNA for purposes of 
including it in a “cold case file” renders the special needs doctrine 
inapplicable.232  This distinction only teaches law enforcement officials 
to assert a goal of “rehabilitation through deterrence” rather than 
catching repeat offenders.  It would be more appropriate to determine 
whether the fact of a criminal conviction so reduces the individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy that extracting their DNA does not 
violate their Fourth Amendment rights. 
 Second, a test designed to permit the administrative state to 
function helpfully focuses Fourth Amendment doctrine on the 
machinery of the administrative state and incentivizes legislative and 
regulatory standards to protect individual privacy.  Thus, in Burger, 
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court that to justify an exception to the 
warrant requirement, a regulatory scheme must adequately substitute a 
warrant by giving notice that particular searches are lawful, with a 
delineation of the search’s scope that limits the discretion of state 
officials performing such searches.233  Again, the potential for poor 
application of this regulatory and legislative focus lies in the fact that 
Burger itself exemplifies how the Supreme Court’s examination of a 
regulatory regime’s adequacy can be “flaccid.”234  But Burger’s 
discussion of how a detailed regulatory regime can provide the same 
value that a warrant provides is an important element of explaining the 
value of the special needs test, which also permits replacement of a 
                                                 
 230. 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987); see supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 231. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 841 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., 
concurring).  Various state and federal courts have upheld mandatory DNA testing of convicts 
under a special needs analysis.  Id. at 830-31 (majority opinion) (collecting cases); see also 
Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test:  A Roadblock to the 
National Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19-28 (2004) (arguing that 
special needs justify DNA databases). 
 232. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 233. 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).  Whether Justice Blackmun’s analysis lived up to that 
standard in Burger is another matter.  Primus argues it failed to do so.  Primus, supra note 14, 
at 283-84. 
 234. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 98; see also id. at 102-03 (describing the 
relatively minimal limits imposed by the regulatory scheme at issue). 
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warrant requirement with an administrative scheme.  It also creates 
incentives for legislatures and agencies to more specifically delineate 
procedures for special needs searches and seizures to increase the 
likelihood of deference to challenged searches and seizures,235 and thus 
to impose some modest limits on official discretion to balance 
administrative search regimes with individual privacy and reduce the 
wide variations in responses to similar facts.236 
 Third, through its focus on “programmatic purpose”237 (rather 
than individual officials’ subjective intent), the special needs doctrine 
creates an incentive for policy makers to limit the most invasive form 
of state intervention.  Commentators have recognized how the special 
needs test encourages state and local governments to “develop more 
effective, flexible approaches” to various social problems “without 
imposing the often ignored costs of enlarging the scope of criminal 
liability.”238  The school setting at issue in T.L.O. provides the most-apt 
examples of the special needs doctrine’s incentive structure.  T.L.O. 
and its progeny encouraged school districts that are developing drug 
testing policies to draw bright lines in those policies (the districts 
whose drug test policies were upheld in Vernonia School District 47J 
v. Acton and Board of Education v. Earls decided, by policy, to neither 
threaten to, nor actually, turn over drug test results to the juvenile 
justice system and instead offered those students assistance and less-
severe, non-law-enforcement punitive consequences).  Whatever the 
pedagogic or disciplinary benefits of those drug tests, the special needs 
test helps limit those policies to school issues and avoid more-severe 
consequences.239 
 T.L.O. has been less successful at limiting the severity of state 
intervention following school disciplinary incidents.  School districts 
and law enforcement agencies have grown closer to a point that the 
mainstream media has prominently explored—how fourth graders’ 
school-yard offenses can become law enforcement and courtroom 
matters—and the United States Attorney General and United States 
                                                 
 235. Amar, supra note 116, at 816-17. 
 236. Amsterdam, supra note 135, at 416-19. 
 237. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001). 
 238. Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing:  Confessions of a Former 
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1062-63 (2003). 
 239. For example, Justice Ginsburg challenged the reasonableness of a policy that 
required of drug testing all students engaged in extracurricular activities, which was upheld in 
Earls, for irrationally “steering students at greatest risk for substance abuse away from 
extracurricular involvement that potentially may palliate drug problems.”  Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Secretary of Education have called for such practices “to stop.”240  This 
problem results from an inability to enforce T.L.O.’s rule.  
Summarizing school search cases, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
observed that the decisive variable tends to be the level of involvement 
of law enforcement officers in particular searches.241  While police 
involvement in a particular search certainly is relevant, overempha-
sizing this point violates Ferguson II’s instruction to focus on the 
programmatic purpose of many of these searches.  That purpose is 
increasingly to identify evidence to turn over to law enforcement, a 
trend which should lead (but has not yet led) courts to enforce more 
seriously the special needs test in school contexts.  Schools would have 
authority to maintain safety and discipline, but should be prevented 
from routinely and programmatically turning school-yard offenses into 
criminal cases, a key element of the school-to-prison pipeline.242  
Schools should be forced to choose between using the informal 
procedures permitted by T.L.O. for school disciplinary consequences 
only or the more formal warrant and probable cause procedures if they 
turn students over to law enforcement. 
 Child protection investigations could provide another example of 
the programmatic purpose test’s value if the special needs doctrine 
focused on serious non-law-enforcement consequences.  Requiring 
probable cause and a warrant before seizing children for interviews or 
inspecting homes would impose an administrative burden on state 
child protection officials.243  That burden creates an important and 
valuable incentive for those officials to find some alternative means to 
achieve their goals without triggering those Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
 240. Donna St. George, Texas Students Sent from Classroom to Courtroom, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-texas-schools-a-
criminal-response-to-misbehavior/2011/08/04/gIQA5EG9UJ_story.html (summarizing the 
conviction of a Houston-area fourth grader for fighting on a school bus and reporting on 
statements of United States Attorney General Eric Holder and United States Department of 
Education Secretary Arne Duncan). 
 241. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); see also Feld, supra note 162, 
at 889 (“Courts’ assessments of the proper standard—reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause—to search often hinge on whether a school official or a police officer initiated it.”). 
 242. Kagan, supra note 148, at 310-12. 
 243. An administrative burden must be distinguished from a burden that would prevent 
the government from achieving its purpose in child protection investigations.  The defendants 
in Camreta argued that the latter was the case, an argument which requires establishing that 
obtaining a warrant would prevent the government from adequately investigating alleged 
abuse.  Brief for Petitioner at 43-46, Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Nos. 09-
1478 and 09-1454), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_1478_PetitionerJamesAlford.authcheckda
m.pdf.  That point was contested by S.G.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 50, at 53. 
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protections.  As discussed above, the majority of child protection 
investigations involve relatively low-risk allegations, and the vast 
majority do not lead to removals,244 leading some child protection 
systems to develop differential response systems.245  These systems ask 
families who are the subject of low-risk allegations to participate in 
voluntary “family assessments” to determine which, if any, services 
would help the family and help keep the children safe.  Such families 
generally would not be subject to substantiation for abuse or neglect or 
removal of children.246  Crucially, the core, fundamental right of family 
integrity would not be at stake with such assessments; thus, the special 
needs doctrine would apply.  Investigative resources, including those 
necessary to seek warrants and document probable cause, would focus 
on higher-risk cases.  Some jurisdictions now assign up to 70% of 
abuse and neglect allegations to family assessment tracks,247 something 
that more meaningful Fourth Amendment protections could make the 
norm. 
 Incentivizing family assessment tracks will reduce invasions of 
children’s and families’ privacy and likely serve children’s interests 
more effectively than the status quo of investigating all children who 
are the subject of child protection hotline reports.  One of the 
remarkable features of the status quo is how little good is done when 
child protection authorities investigate families for suspected abuse or 
neglect but do not remove children.248  A longitudinal study of children 
who had been the subjects of a child maltreatment investigation found 
that these children, as compared to children with similar family 
problems but no child protection contact, had no perceptible 
differences in social support, family functioning, or child behavior 
problems.249  The bottom line, as the study’s title states, is that these 
investigations were “A Missed Opportunity for Prevention” 
                                                 
 244. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 246. A child protection agency might still choose to investigate a family assigned to an 
assessment track.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.04(c)(3) (2012).  States’ experience with 
differential response suggest that such decisions are made rarely.  See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF SOC. 
SERVS., EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM 12 (2008), available at http:// 
www.dss.virginia.gov/files/about/reports/children/cps/all_other/2008/differentialresponsesyst
em_evaluation_annualreport_2008_12-08.pdf (reporting that only 2% of families referred to 
an assessment track were subsequently referred for an investigation). 
 247. VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 246, at 5. 
 248. I do not advocate removing these children.  Rather, I advocate for more-effective 
interventions to resolve serious problems without traumatizing children via removal. 
 249. Kristine A. Campbell et al., Household, Family, and Child Risk Factors After an 
Investigation for Suspected Child Maltreatment:  A Missed Opportunity for Prevention, 164 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 943, 943 (2010). 
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(specifically, to provide proven services).250  The study’s findings were 
so dramatic that the medical journal that published the study 
simultaneously published an editorial radically asserting that “Child 
Protective Services has outlived its usefulness” and recommending 
that the better response to allegations of neglect is to provide various 
service interventions rather than formal investigations.251 
 These incentive benefits are less powerful under an older 
proposal to reform the special needs doctrine.  In 1989, Stephen 
Schulhofer proposed drawing a bright line between state action to exert 
“social control” over “private activity” and “searches in aid of the 
internal governance objectives of public enterprises” (such as school 
discipline), with any search or seizure serving internal governance 
subject only to a reasonableness analysis.252  This approach would 
create incentives to avoid social control and thus maximize liberty, an 
important benefit.253  But once a search or seizure qualifies as an 
internal governance action, the Fourth Amendment incentive for the 
state to limit the extent to which an action invades individual liberty 
would disappear.  The potential to incentivize less-liberty-infringing 
responses to school disciplinary incidents, which Schulhofer 
categorizes as internal governance issues,254 would be lost. 
B. Reasonably Foreseeable Consequences to Fundamental 
Constitutional Rights, Not Just Law Enforcement Purposes 
 The first and most important reform to the special needs test 
should be to broaden its focus beyond the existence or absence of law 
enforcement purposes and to focus instead on the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a challenged search or seizure on 
fundamental constitutional rights.  Fundamental constitutional rights 
                                                 
 250. Id. 
 251. Abraham B. Bergman, Child Protective Services Has Outlived Its Usefulness, 
164 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 978, 978-79 (2010). 
 252. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118. 
 253. As Schulhofer acknowledges, the terms “social control” and “internal 
governance” do not have crystal-clear boundaries.  Id. at 116.  It is likely that there would be 
significant overlap between his approach and mine, as many (if not most) searches and 
seizures that affect fundamental constitutional rights would also work to achieve some form 
of social control.  The primary, principled difference between his approach and mine is that a 
test focusing on the constitutional rights that are implicated by a search or seizure more 
directly invites analysis of such actions in their full constitutional context.  Infra notes 284-
293 and accompanying text.  In practice, we differ in our approaches to school search cases, 
which Schulhofer categorizes as internal governance actions, Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118, 
but which I contend often implicate fundamental constitutional rights. 
 254. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 118. 
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include all those either deemed “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” and thus incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment255 or, like the right to family integrity, deemed to be a 
fundamental right provided by another amendment.256  A focus on 
criminal consequences is already present, even if the Supreme Court 
has not adopted that language.  Limiting that focus to criminal 
consequences cannot be justified, and the doctrine must be reformed to 
account for constitutional consequences beyond those of the criminal 
justice system.  If the purpose of the search or seizure makes it 
reasonably likely or foreseeable that a consequence significantly 
implicating a constitutional right beyond the Fourth Amendment, the 
special needs doctrine should not apply. 
1. Focus on Consequences Explains Results in Special Needs Cases 
 Focusing on the presence or absence of intended or reasonably 
foreseen criminal consequences best explains the results of special 
needs cases.257  The intended criminal consequences explain the 
decisions against those searches and seizures in Camara, City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, and Ferguson II, and the absence of such 
consequences explains the decisions in Acton, Earls, Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, O’Connor, and Quon.  T.L.O. may be explained by the 
lack of an intended law enforcement consequence at the initiation of 
the search, when the assistant principal thought he was searching for 
cigarettes (and not marijuana), and may be criticized for ignoring the 
(presumably intended) law enforcement consequence that followed.258  
Lidster may be explained by the absence of expected or intended 
criminal consequences to the individuals stopped.  Given the 
“notoriously unclear” state of this particular doctrine,259 a focus on 
reasonably foreseen consequences does not explain every case, 
especially Burger and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.  
But, as argued above, the Court did not properly conceive of Burger as 
a special needs case (even if that misconception led to an important 
                                                 
 255. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 256. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 257. The risk that officials may unexpectedly find some evidence of a crime and turn 
that evidence over to the police does not make the discovery reasonably foreseeable.  For 
instance, the seizure in Lidster led to the discovery of admissible evidence of and prosecution 
for drunk driving.  Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004). 
 258. Supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
 259. Primus, supra note 14, at 257. 
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discussion of administrative substitutes for a warrant procedure),260 and 
the Court drew a flawed line in Sitz.261 
 Indeed, the Court’s first major administrative search case, 
Camara, struck down a scheme that imposed criminal sanctions on 
individuals who refused to consent to a particular search.262  Camara 
also framed its discussion of law enforcement purposes in terms of 
consequences to the individual searched:  the home search minimally 
invaded privacy because the search was not “aimed at the discovery of 
evidence of crime,” implying that the intended or reasonably expected 
consequences relate to the level of privacy invaded.263  Schulhofer 
offered a similar analysis of Camara, writing that the Court must have 
“meant to stress not [law enforcement] motivation but [law 
enforcement] effects.”264 
 The Court reinforced the conclusion that consequences matter to 
the administrative search analysis just four years later in Wyman v. 
James.265  The Court upheld a state law requiring individuals to consent 
to home visits as a condition of receiving welfare benefits.  Barbara 
James refused to give such consent, but the only consequence was her 
loss of welfare benefits.266  No criminal consequence followed, and 
because individuals lack a constitutional entitlement to welfare 
benefits, “nothing of constitutional magnitude [was] involved.”267  A 
similar statement could be made regarding later cases upholding 
searches and seizures under the special needs doctrine:  where all that 
is at issue is public employment (O’Connor and Quon), railway and 
sensitive employment positions (Skinner and Von Raab), or 
extracurricular school activities (Acton and Earls), no constitutional 
rights are involved, and criminal prosecution is neither likely nor 
intended. 
                                                 
 260. Supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text. 
 261. Supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 262. 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967).  Summarizing the case, the Court wrote:  “[A]ppellant 
has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his 
leasehold without a warrant. . . . [W]e therefore conclude that . . . appellant may not 
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 263. Id. at 537. 
 264. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 93. 
 265. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
 266. Id. at 317-18 (“We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, 
and that the beneficiary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act.  If consent to the 
visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place.  The aid then never begins or merely ceases, 
as the case may be.  There is no entry of the home and there is no search.”). 
 267. Id. at 324. 
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 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
misread Wyman and other special needs cases as holding that 
“investigative home visits by social workers are not subject to the same 
scrutiny as searches in the criminal context,” even when the search at 
issue is by a child protection social worker.268  This superficial analogy 
(it was a social worker in Wyman, and it is a social worker in a child 
protection case) ignores the different implications of the two social 
workers’ visits.  In Wyman, the social worker could take away 
something to which the individual had no constitutional right.  In the 
child protection context, the social worker could take away a parent’s 
and child’s right to family integrity, something with the utmost 
constitutional protection.  The Fourth Circuit’s superficial analogy is 
understandable given the special needs doctrine’s binary, but it is no 
less wrong. 
 The consequences of a search were again decisive in Ferguson II.  
The search itself, in which blood was drawn routinely from pregnant 
women admitted to the hospital by medical personnel without the 
presence of police, did not raise constitutional concerns.  Only the 
subsequent reporting of positive drug test results to law enforcement, 
and the resulting criminal prosecutions, made the hospital’s actions 
unconstitutional.269  This is Ferguson II’s key lesson:  a search’s conse-
quences, not its circumstances, matter most.  One might argue that law 
enforcement purposes deserve special treatment because police 
officers’ orders to submit to a search or seizure impose extra anxiety 
on individuals.  Indeed, it would surely unsettle a woman in labor or 
immediately postpartum to be interrupted in her hospital room by a 
uniformed and armed police officer insisting that she take a drug test.  
Precisely because that did not happen in Ferguson II, that case stands 
for the proposition that something else (namely, the consequences of a 
search or seizure) determines the side of the special needs binary on 
which the search or seizure falls. 
 Ferguson II reached this conclusion through explicit references to 
the constitutional rights at stake when law enforcement became 
involved, stating that the intention to “incriminat[e]” patients triggers 
constitutional protections for criminal suspects.270  Child welfare cases 
also trigger a set of constitutional protections identified by the 
                                                 
 268. Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 269. Supra notes 165-180 and accompanying text. 
 270. Ferguson II, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
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Supreme Court:  a hearing on a parent’s fitness,271 an elevated burden 
of proof if the case reaches the termination-of-parental-rights stage,272 
and any other protection required by procedural due process.  These 
cases also trigger a set of statutory provisions designed to protect 
children’s and parents’ right to family integrity and to codify their 
procedural due process rights (such as a right to counsel,273 a right to an 
agency’s “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal of a child from a 
parent,274 and a right to regular judicial reviews of ongoing foster 
care275). 
 Less dramatically, the Supreme Court focused on the 
consequences to individuals who are searched and seized in Lidster, 
which approved of a highway checkpoint that sought information from 
the public about a hit-and-run on the roadway the previous week, and 
which led to police arresting a drunk driver.276  The checkpoint had an 
undeniable law enforcement purpose:  to obtain evidence leading to an 
arrest in the hit-and-run.  But the consequence of that purpose was not 
directed at the individuals stopped at the checkpoint who, “in all 
likelihood,” would not include the culprit.277  In another checkpoint 
case, a search was ruled unconstitutional when the checkpoint’s 
purpose was “to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were 
committing a crime,” that is, when the expected consequences of the 
seizure were directed at the individuals seized.278 
                                                 
 271. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). 
 272. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982).  Multiple states also apply a 
heightened burden of proof to an initial adjudication of abuse or neglect.  E.g., In re G.S., 630 
S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Adoption of Mary, 610 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Mass. 1993); 
In re D.D.H., 875 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 273. A large majority of states provide parents with a right to counsel throughout a 
child abuse or neglect case.  Vivek Sankaran, A National Survey on a Parent’s Right to 
Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights and Dependency Cases, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. 
CHILD ADVOCACY CLINIC, http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ccl/specialprojects/ 
Documents/National Survey on a Parent’s Right to Counsel.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).  
Describing children’s right to counsel is more difficult because some states provide a right to 
an attorney who will represent the child’s views and others provide a right to an attorney who 
will represent what they believe to be in the child’s best interest.  Regardless, the vast majority 
of states provide some kind of legal representation to children in child abuse and neglect 
cases.  JEAN KOH PETERS, U.S. JURISDICTION SUMMARY CHART (2006), http://www.law.yale. 
edu/rcw/rcw/us_summary_chart.ppt. 
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i) (2006). 
 275. Id. § 675(5)(C). 
 276. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004). 
 277. Id. at 423. 
 278. Id. (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)) (distinguishing 
Edmond’s general crime-control checkpoint from Lidster ’s information-seeking checkpoint). 
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 This focus on consequences also helps respond to one critique of 
the special needs doctrine.  Ric Simmons accuses the Court of 
“weakening . . . the ‘noncriminal purpose’ requirement” in the special 
needs cases that followed T.L.O.279  While T.L.O. asserted a clear non-
law-enforcement purpose (maintaining school discipline), Simmons 
argues that the later cases approving suspicionless drug testing of 
students were “barely distinguishable from a standard law enforcement 
purpose:  ‘[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren.’”280  
This riddle is solvable if we look past the stated special need and 
analyze the intended and foreseeable consequences of the search.  
Drugs’ illegality does not mean that concern about drug use 
necessarily has a criminal purpose or consequence.  Explicitly refusing 
to turn over evidence of drug use to law enforcement and instead 
requiring that students engage in drug treatment places a search on the 
noncriminal side of the line.  Conversely, T.L.O. wrongly approved a 
criminal consequence (turning over the evidence found in the search to 
police, leading to prosecution of T.L.O. as a delinquent) without 
considering whether the search had a purpose or reasonable 
expectation of imposing such a consequence.281  That criticism stands 
despite the more clearly noncriminal purpose articulated in that case.282 
2. Analyzing the Constitutional, Not Just Criminal, Consequences 
of a Search or Seizure 
 The special needs doctrine usefully focuses on consequences.  
But its limited focus on criminal consequences is unjustified.283  A 
better approach is to reform the doctrine to focus on important 
constitutional consequences.  If a search or seizure is reasonably likely 
                                                 
 279. Simmons, supra note 187, at 863. 
 280. Id. at 865 (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
 281. Supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 282. A focus on consequences, and, specifically, the absence of criminal conse-
quences, also explains the results in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain public employees).  Paralleling his criticism 
of the school drug testing cases, Simmons criticizes these cases as involving searches whose 
purpose “was essentially to deter illegal activity (drug use), with the dubious argument that 
deterring illegal activity went beyond the standard goals of law enforcement because of the 
highly dangerous or sensitive positions that the employees occupied.”  Simmons, supra note 
187, at 868.  The holding is less dubious when one considers the absence of any criminal 
consequences imposed on employees whose drug tests show evidence of illegal conduct.  Id. 
 283. Supra Part III.E. 
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to threaten another constitutional right, it should not satisfy the special 
needs doctrine. 
 Significant Supreme Court precedent exists for weighing other 
constitutional consequences similarly.  Those consequences form the 
constitutional context for any specific search or seizure; they 
determine whether anything of “constitutional magnitude is 
involved.”284  And context matters to the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
As the Court wrote in Safford, “Changing for gym is getting ready for 
play; exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for 
suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as . . . degrading . . . .”285  
That is, one cannot determine how invasive particular conduct is by 
looking at the precise, physical actions involved (in Safford, a teenager 
undressing) in isolation from its context. 
 My approach would place the Fourth Amendment special needs 
doctrine within the constitutional context of specific searches and 
seizures.  Though a novel idea for the special needs doctrine, it is 
hardly novel for other constitutional rights or for the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the Supreme Court’s procedural due process 
jurisprudence, the greater the importance of the private interest 
affected, the greater the process required to affect that interest.286  Not 
coincidentally, modern procedural due process law, like the special 
needs doctrine, developed in response to the modern administrative 
state and the need to develop legal tests that recognized the different 
impacts of different types of government action.  Similarly, when a 
search or seizure implicates a private interest of a constitutional 
dimension, that fact should be an essential element of the search’s 
context. 
 The Court has also explicitly integrated First and Fifth 
Amendment values into the Fourth Amendment.  A proposed search 
and seizure of items with First Amendment protections (a reporter’s 
notebook or a mosque’s building) calls for applying the Fourth 
Amendment with “scrupulous exactitude.”287  The Court has integrated 
                                                 
 284. Supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 285. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009). 
 286. Mathews v. Eldridge built this principle into its procedural due process test, 
requiring analysis of “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” as the 
first element of the three-part procedural due process test.  424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  A 
commentator has recognized that the Mathews test “calls for more formal procedures where 
more grievous deprivations are threatened.”  Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”:  A 
Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 373 
(1999). 
 287. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).  Justice William Douglas made a 
similar point in his Frank v. Maryland dissent, connecting the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
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Fifth Amendment self-incrimination values into the Fourth 
Amendment.  Boyd, the nineteenth-century case indirectly relied upon 
in Camara, explicitly connected the Fifth Amendment implications of 
the document seizure at issue to the Court’s holding that the seizure 
violated the Fourth Amendment.288  Though the Court may not have 
applied this principle scrupulously in all cases,289 it stands for the 
proposition that people have a greater expectation of privacy when 
other fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.290  Similarly, in 
applying the community caretaking doctrine (itself somewhat 
analogous to the special needs doctrine), the Washington Supreme 
Court has explicitly weighed individuals’ constitutional rights beyond 
the Fourth Amendment, including the freedoms of association and 
expression.291 
 The lesson, as Akhil Amar put it, is that we should look to the 
entire Constitution “to identify constitutional values that are elements 
of constitutional reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment.292  
                                                                                                             
Amendments as “safeguarding not only privacy and protection against self-incrimination but 
‘conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.’”  359 U.S. 360, 376 
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 
(1956)).  Justice Douglas’s dissenting view became the majority view when Camara 
overturned Frank.  A First Amendment concern can also be raised in child protection 
investigations.  E.g., In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3652 (Ct. App. 
May 22, 2008). 
 288. Supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 289. Amar has criticized the Court for its handling of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547 (1978), for failing to apply the Stanford principle faithfully.  Amar, supra note 116, 
at 805-06. 
 290. Avoiding law enforcement consequences by imposing First Amendment 
consequences should not resolve special needs doctrine.  Alafair S. Burke hypothesized civil 
seizures of noisemaking devices as an attractive alternative to criminal sanctions of 
noisemakers, and a positive illustration of the policy incentives served by the special needs 
test’s focus on law enforcement purposes.  Burke, supra note 238, at 1031.  Civil seizure may 
indeed be preferable to criminal sanctions, but that fact alone should not place the proposed 
seizures under a relaxed Fourth Amendment framework, because such seizures could directly 
affect First Amendment rights.  (If the particular devices lack significant First Amendment 
protection, it is a different matter.) 
 291. State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668, 679 (Wash. 2000) (en banc). 
 292. Amar says to examine the Bill of Rights, in which he includes the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Amar, supra note 116, at 805 & n.170.  For clarity of application, I would 
examine all substantive constitutional rights deemed fundamental—either deemed “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty” and thus incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or deemed to be a fundamental 
right under another amendment, Amar, supra note 116, at 805.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  As the phrase “constitutional reasonableness” suggests, Amar calls for a 
review of the reasonableness of most searches and seizures, rather than a warrant and 
probable cause approach—this is an approach I do not share.  His separate insight that Fourth 
Amendment analysis must incorporate other constitutional concerns directly applies to my 
approach. 
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That a search or seizure, as in Camreta, affects a fundamental 
constitutional right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
considered in evaluating the action’s constitutionality.  The failure of 
the present special needs doctrine is that it avoids such an evaluation 
by focusing entirely on the presence or extent of a law enforcement 
purpose.  Schulhofer’s line between social control and internal 
governance searches and seizures would be a dramatic improvement 
over the status quo, but that line less precisely directs consideration of 
other constitutional values, unlike a test focused on whether a search or 
seizure implicates constitutional rights.293 
 Of course, delineating fundamental constitutional rights is no 
obvious task.  I would include all substantive rights that spring from 
the Constitution itself, most of which are found in the Bill of Rights or 
later amendments (especially the Fourteenth Amendment).  As an 
illustration, one can distinguish searches and seizures of public school 
students, which threaten juvenile justice or child protection 
consequences, from searches and seizures implicating school 
disciplinary actions, like short suspensions.  The former implicates 
rights substantively created by the Constitution294 while the latter 
implicates rights created by state law, which only trigger modest 
procedural constitutional protections.295  A more difficult case might 
involve more severe disciplinary consequences like expulsion.296  
Litigation would necessarily focus on which reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of various searches and seizures trigger constitutional 
protections, a task entirely in line with the special needs doctrine’s 
focus on consequences and a contextual, constitutional understanding 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
 More generally, this contextual analysis flows from Fourth 
Amendment principles that animate the seminal case of Katz v. United 
States and its discussion of what creates a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” that the Fourth Amendment will protect.297  Justice John 
Harlan’s concurrence explained that the Fourth Amendment protects 
                                                 
 293. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 116. 
 294. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing a right to 
family integrity); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing a right to juvenile justice). 
 295. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).  In addition, state constitutions do 
provide a substantive right to an education.  See Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action:  
Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 
(2003) (discussing state constitutional provisions).  A state constitutional analog to the Fourth 
Amendment, therefore, might lead to a different result than a federal constitutional analysis. 
 296. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
 297. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 
 
 
 
2012] BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT 415 
 
an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”298  Justice Harlan later expounded, “This question must 
. . . be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the 
likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced 
against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”299  
If an action “significantly jeopardize[s] the sense of security which is 
the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties,” then it 
deserves significant Fourth Amendment protection.300 
 Applying these lessons to child protection investigations 
powerfully illustrates why constitutional rights beyond those accorded 
to criminal suspects must be included.  Child protection searches 
directly affect Fourteenth Amendment rights.  They threaten to support 
state action to take custody of a child away from a parent, which is the 
most fundamental interference with a parent’s constitutional right to 
“care, custody, and control” of their child and to the child’s right to 
remain with the parent.301  Indeed, in Camreta, the child suffered 
precisely that kind of “uncertainty and dislocation” when placed in 
foster care for three weeks as a result of her allegedly coerced 
statements.302  It should be plain that this type of action can shake an 
individual’s “sense of security.” 
 Even when a child protection investigation does not lead to the 
removal of a child from their family, it affects Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  The Constitution gives parents immense authority:  the right to 
be a “despot,” likely benevolent, over their children.303  The seizure of 
children to discuss allegations of abuse or neglect is itself a sharp limit 
of this parental authority.  Indeed, that limitation is the entire point:  
state officials seek to isolate children from their parents to discuss, free 
of parental influence, whether the parents have provided adequate 
care.304  Searches of the family home and compelled interviews of 
                                                 
 298. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 299. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  The Court has expressed its concern 
that unnecessary intervention in family life will cause children to “suffer from uncertainty 
and dislocation.”  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).  Circuit courts have 
consistently found that children have a right to family integrity.  E.g., Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. 
Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
 302. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. 
 303. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 675-76 (2006). 
 304. The Camreta defendants acknowledged this point.  Supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
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everyone in the home necessarily imply a limit to the parents’ authority 
over their home, the physical location where a parent’s constitutional 
rights are at their highest and unmediated by school or other authority 
figures. 
 Child development theory, on which the Supreme Court has 
relied in other cases involving children’s constitutional rights,305 is 
consistent with constitutional protections against such interventions 
into the parent-child relationship.  Doriane Lambelet Coleman has 
summarized the scientific evidence that children have a sense of 
privacy and bodily integrity from very young ages, a sense which 
searches and seizures may violate—and those violations “cause real 
emotional and psychological harm.”306  In their seminal work on state 
intervention in children’s lives, Joseph Goldstein and his coauthors 
wrote: 
Any invasion of family privacy alters the relationships between family 
members and undermines the effectiveness of parental authority.  
Children, on their part, react with anxiety even to temporary 
infringements of parental autonomy.  The younger the child and the 
greater her own helplessness and dependence, the stronger is her need 
to experience her parents as her law-givers—safe, reliable, all-powerful, 
and independent.  Therefore, no state intrusion ought to be authorized 
unless probable and sufficient cause has been established . . . .307 
 Goldstein and his coauthors thus suggest a dramatic break from 
current child protection practices.  Child protection authorities impose 
similar “temporary infringements of parental authority” in response to 
virtually any allegation of abuse or neglect.308  Goldstein and his 
coauthors would replace that current regime with one requiring that 
some standard be met before such invasive, investigatory steps could 
occur.  The authors do not describe the legal mechanism they would 
use, but the phrase “probable and sufficient cause” suggests Fourth 
Amendment procedures.309 
 Child protection cases also illustrate why the special needs 
doctrine ought not elevate criminal consequences over all other 
consequences because they show that criminal consequences are not 
inherently more severe than others.  To maintain the current special 
                                                 
 305. E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010) (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)). 
 306. Coleman, supra note 11, at 515-16, 520-21. 
 307. Goldstein et al., supra note 106, at 97. 
 308. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
 309. Goldstein et al., supra note 106, at 97. 
 
 
 
 
2012] BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT 417 
 
needs doctrine, one must accept that it is worse to be placed in prison 
for a short period of time than to lose your children or, from the child’s 
perspective, to be taken from your parents and placed with strangers.  
As Amy Sinden has convincingly written: 
Considering the fear and trauma that removal can invoke in a child, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that many parents, if given the choice, 
would rather themselves spend several days in prison, than see their 
child taken away from all people and things familiar to spend even a 
few nights with well-meaning strangers in foster care.310 
 The Supreme Court has occasionally suggested that it views the 
fundamental substantive due process right of family integrity and the 
right to liberty, at stake in a criminal case, as similarly serious.311  The 
most detailed discussion came in Santosky v. Kramer, which addressed 
the burden of proof borne by the state in a termination-of-parental-
rights case.312  Having decided that a preponderance of the evidence 
burden gave insufficient deference to the fundamental constitutional 
rights at stake, the Court addressed whether a beyond a reasonable 
doubt burden, with analogies to criminal cases, was needed, or whether 
a clear and convincing burden would suffice.313  The Court chose the 
latter because termination-of-parental-rights cases often involved 
psychiatric evidence on issues “difficult to prove to a level of absolute 
certainty.”314  This explanation does not suggest that the rights at stake 
in a termination case are less than the rights at stake in a criminal trial.  
Rather, it suggests that the type of facts that need to be proven 
(whether a child is “permanently neglected”315 in the former, compared 
with whether a defendant committed specific acts in the latter) 
necessitates a partially elevated burden.  By declining to hold that the 
interests at stake in child welfare cases are categorically less important 
                                                 
 310. Sinden, supra note 286, at 360-61.  Sinden gives a fuller critique of the too-often-
assumed primacy of loss of physical liberty over other forms of liberty.  Id. at 358-68; see 
also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS:  THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 17 (2002) 
(“Removing children from their homes is perhaps the most severe government intrusion into 
the lives of citizens.”). 
 311. At least one state court has equated the Fourth Amendment rights of children in 
child protection cases to adults accused of crimes, while ruling that a requested sex abuse 
exam of a teenage girl was unnecessary when conclusive proof of such abuse already existed.  
In re Shernise C., 934 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2011) (“An innocent child should certainly 
have as much right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as someone suspected 
of committing a crime.”). 
 312. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 313. Id. at 768. 
 314. Id. at 769. 
 315. Id. at 747. 
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than those in criminal cases, Santosky evoked the dissenting opinions 
written the prior term in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, in 
which the Court held by a five-to-four vote that parents do not have a 
constitutional right to counsel in termination-of-parental-rights 
proceedings.316  One Justice wrote that “there can be few losses more 
grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”317  Another went 
further:  “Although both deprivations [a prison sentence and 
termination of parental rights] are serious, often the deprivation of 
parental rights will be the more grievous of the two.  The plain 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that both 
deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law.”318 
 Such statements are not limited to family integrity cases.  The 
Court recently noted that the nominally civil sanction of deportation is 
“sometimes the most important part” of consequences that flow from a 
criminal conviction.319  That is, core criminal sanctions (a prison 
sentence, a fine, the public stigma associated with a criminal 
conviction) may all impose a less grievous harm to many individuals 
than a sanction imposed by the civil immigration law. 
 Still, the law generally prioritizes criminal consequences over 
civil ones, even those that implicate fundamental rights and severely 
limit liberty.  An earlier burden of proof case highlighted how the 
beyond a reasonable doubt burden serves to bolster the “moral force of 
the criminal law” and thus is unlikely applicable to civil actions, even 
those leading to severe liberty infringements.320  The moral force of 
criminal law also reflects the social stigma that accompanies a 
conviction.321  It is therefore unsurprising that at least one commentator 
has suggested that the special needs doctrine serves to distinguish 
“morally stigmatizing” government goals from less stigmatizing 
                                                 
 316. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 317. Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 318. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 319. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).  Padilla noted that deportation 
is “not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,” but emphasized the “close connection” between 
the criminal and civil bodies of law.  Id. at 1481-82. 
 320. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 364 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Like Santosky, Addington also focused 
on other differences between criminal cases and the problem at issue—civil commitment of 
the mentally ill.  “The subtleties and nuances” of mental health conditions and diagnoses 
threatened to make the beyond a reasonable doubt burden insurmountable in any case.  Id. at 
430.  Which dicta in Santosky and Addington are most important cannot be definitively 
determined from the text of the opinions themselves. 
 321. Merely describing conduct as criminal—even if prosecution cannot or does not 
occur—creates a stigma worthy of the Supreme Court’s attention.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
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ones.322  Put another way, criminal investigations can “damage 
reputation or manifest official suspicion,”323 and impose a “targeting 
harm” distinct from the harm to one’s privacy caused by a particular 
search or seizure.324 
 But even this morally stigmatizing force does not justify drawing 
a line around criminal consequences.  For instance, the stigma attached 
to drunk driving (at least, when it does not lead to harmful accidents) 
is less than that attributed to drug use.325  Yet searches aimed at 
identifying the latter can be distinguished from criminal enforcement 
purposes (as Von Raab, Skinner, Acton, and Earls make clear) while 
the seizures aimed at the former (in Sitz) lead to criminal 
consequences.  Ferguson II provides an even more powerful example 
by illustrating the tremendous stigma applied to maternal drug use, 
especially among poor, African-American women.326 
 One can broaden the point:  society holds somewhat stereotypical 
and idealized views of parenthood, especially motherhood, and 
concomitantly places a tremendous stigma on bad parents, especially 
bad mothers.327  The stigma is both gendered and racial; our country’s 
long and troubled racial history “has long stereotyped poor Black 
women . . . as incompetent, uncaring, and even pathological 
mothers.”328  Beyond legal literature, other writers have identified the 
powerful social meaning attached to judgments of one’s quality as a 
mother, and how deeply rooted such judgments are in American 
history and society.329  It should be apparent that this social stigma has 
nothing to do with whether evidence of maternal drug use supports a 
criminal charge against the mother, a civil action to remove a child 
                                                 
 322. Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?:  Consent, Care, Privacy, and 
Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 30 
(2002). 
 323. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 116; see also Debra Livingston, Police, Community 
Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 274. 
 324. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1486-87 (1996). 
 325. Taslitz, supra note 322, at 67-72. 
 326. Id. at 76-77. 
 327. See Marie Ashe, “Bad Mothers,” “Good Lawyers,” and “Legal Ethics,” 82 GEO. 
L.J. 2533, 2547 (1993) (describing the “gendered focus of child dependency law” as 
imposing a “stigma of ‘badness’” on women). 
 328. ROBERTS, supra note 310, at 28. 
 329. See generally “BAD” MOTHERS:  THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky eds., 1998) (discussing the social impacts of 
mother-blaming theories).  For a more recent and mass-marketed topic on similar themes, see 
AYELET WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER:  A CHRONICLE OF MATERNAL CRIMES, MINOR CALAMITIES, 
AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE (2009). 
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from that mother’s custody, or both.  Any use of such evidence would 
impose a severe stigma.  That is particularly so when such evidence is 
used to establish that mothers are unfit parents, as occurs in child 
protection cases (that is, to target individuals for a formal, adverse, and 
stigmatizing judgment).  And when authorities place children in foster 
care, the stigma passes down by a generation.330 
 Finally, lower federal court child protection cases aptly illustrate 
why the special needs doctrine should focus on important 
constitutional consequences of searches and seizures because federal 
appellate courts have already begun linking Fourteenth Amendment 
analyses to Fourth Amendment analyses.  These cases arise when 
parents and children challenge what they allege to be an unnecessary 
and unconstitutional removal of the child by child protection 
authorities.  Parent and child plaintiffs typically allege that the 
challenged removal violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to 
family integrity and the child’s Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable seizures.  In Tenenbaum v. Williams, the Second Circuit 
addressed a Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment challenge to the state’s 
removal of a child and subsequent medical examination of her.331  After 
discussing, but not deciding, whether the special needs doctrine 
applied, the Second Circuit stated, “Whatever Fourth Amendment 
analysis is employed, then, it results in a test for present purposes 
similar to the procedural due-process standard.”332  That test raised a 
colorable claim of unconstitutional removal and thus demanded a 
ruling in favor of the parents and child.  At least two other circuits have 
held similarly.333 
 The connection drawn, in Tenenbaum and similar cases, between 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is particularly clear in cases 
that challenge the removal of a child as a violation of both 
Amendments.  A removal involves physically taking custody of a child 
and is thus undeniably a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.  A 
removal directly infringes on a parent’s due process right to care, 
                                                 
 330. E.g., ALEX HALEY & MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, at 21 
(Grove Press 31st ed. 1992) (1964) (describing the stigma of being a “state child”). 
 331. 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 332. Id. at 605. 
 333. Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 428-29 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The action challenged 
in this case involved not only a warrantless search, but also the removal of a child from his 
parents[, which implicates] the interest of the parents in keeping the family together.” (citing 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)); Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 
1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children [as applies to parents’ claims].”). 
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custody, and control, which the Supreme Court has held may generally 
not occur without a hearing on the parent’s fitness.334  A less clear 
connection exists to a CPS investigation like the seizure at issue in 
Camreta, which involved state action that intervened in family 
integrity to a lesser degree immediately and only threatens a future 
removal.  But the fundamental point that the Fourteenth Amendment 
rights at stake affect the Fourth Amendment analysis applies in full 
force. 
C. Refocus on the Warrant Requirement’s Purpose 
 The special needs doctrine asks when government officials 
should be able to avoid the burden of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
clause.  Focusing instead on the existence of a law enforcement 
purpose distracts from the ultimate purpose of the test.  Burger 
suggests a useful line of analysis for cases involving special needs 
searches.335  When administrative standards advise individuals that a 
search or seizure is legal, has a defined scope, and limits the discretion 
of government officials, then a warrant is less likely to add value.336  
On the other hand, when the decision to search or seize, or the decision 
regarding scope and methods to be used, involves discretion or does 
not follow clear limits, then a detached and neutral magistrate provides 
essential protections. 
 Child protection again demonstrates how the special needs 
doctrine’s focus on law enforcement purposes prevents it from 
fulfilling its goal of determining when a warrant is required.  Child 
protection investigations have substantial, case-by-case variation 
necessitating significant executive discretion regarding when and how 
to perform an investigation.  These investigations are inherently 
adversarial,337 creating an “often competitive enterprise” in which child 
protection investigators try to ferret out evidence of abuse or neglect.338  
Even with some regulatory guidance, these investigations call out for a 
check on state officials’ discretion.  And the regulatory guidance that 
does exist can be violated, as the Camreta facts (leading questions 
asked in violation of state guidance for interviewing children) reveal.339  
                                                 
 334. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). 
 335. As argued supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text, Burger incorrectly held 
that the search at issue served special needs rather than law enforcement purposes. 
 336. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987). 
 337. Supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 338. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
 339. Oregon guidelines caution against “asking numerous leading questions” and 
“making coercive statements” because they will lead to “a higher possibility that some 
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Yet, unless the special needs doctrine can consider purposes beyond 
law enforcement, it will likely permit an unjustified exception to the 
warrant requirement for child protection searches and seizures, and fail 
even to consider violations of government guidelines for child 
protection investigations.  Just as Burger required an administrative 
scheme to limit discretion in a business regulation case, at the very 
least the special needs doctrine should inquire whether a warrant is 
necessary in order to check executive branch discretion in child 
protection investigations. 
D. Applying a Reformed Special Needs Test in Child Protection 
Cases 
 Applying a reformed special needs test can lead to a clearer and 
more analytically sound resolution of Fourth Amendment questions in 
child protection cases.  The first and most important point in the 
analysis is that the foreseeable consequence of child protection 
searches and seizures—removal of children from their parents and 
placement in state custody—is severe and of immense constitutional 
magnitude to both parents and children.  It directly implicates 
fundamental constitutional rights of such a pedigree that they trigger 
many procedural protections.  This point values not only severe civil 
consequences similarly to criminal consequences, but it values the 
impact of this governmental action on children (who experience only 
the civil consequences) as highly as it values the impact on parents 
(who may experience both civil and criminal consequences).  This 
point is true regardless of the involvement of law enforcement or the 
presence of an allegation of physical or sexual abuse that would be 
relatively likely to trigger law enforcement involvement.340 
                                                                                                             
children will make false accusations.”  BOHANNAN ET AL., supra note 80, at 28.  In Camreta, 
the social worker repeatedly made coercive statements:  In response to S.G.’s denial of any 
abuse by her father, “He would say, ‘No, that’s not it,’ and then ask me the same question 
again.  For over an hour, Bob Camreta kept asking me the same questions, just in different 
ways, trying to get me to change my answers.”  Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th 
Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 340. The majority of administrative findings of child maltreatment are for neglect, not 
physical or sexual abuse.  Supra note 33 and accompanying text.  Likewise, state-specific 
data shows that a similar proportion of removals result from neglect and not physical or 
sexual abuse.  E.g., CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, DIST. OF COLUMBIA, ANNUAL REPORT 
FY 2010, at 23 (2011) (listing “neglect” as the primary reason in 531 of 809 removals, with 
physical and sexual abuse accounting for only 202; the remainder falling into categories 
accurately counted as neglect and not abuse, like a parent’s drug abuse, incarceration, or 
“caretaker ill or unable to cope”). 
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 Secondly, child protection searches involve significant discretion.  
Although every allegation, no matter how severe or how credible, must 
be investigated, and every investigation must include certain steps, 
essential details remain within individual caseworkers’ discretion:  
when to search a home or seize a child; whether to request consent 
before such steps; how to interview a potential victim, perpetrator, or 
witness; and whether a physical exam is needed and, if so, who should 
perform it.341  These decisions follow a subjective and case-specific 
evaluation of evidence. 
 Under this analysis, Camreta becomes fairly easy.342  The seizure 
at issue implicated fundamental constitutional rights and led state 
officials to remove S.G. from her family for three weeks.  The time, 
place, and manner of the seizure were discretionary.  Camreta and 
Alford chose when to seize and interview S.G. (several days after 
receiving the allegation, without performing much background 
investigation, and without requesting consent from either of S.G.’s 
parents), chose where to do it (at school, to best isolate S.G. from her 
parents), and chose how to do so (with a series of leading and high-
pressure questions).  Moreover, the interview’s details illustrate the 
problems that arise when child protection authorities exercise 
unchecked discretion. 
 A ruling that child protection searches and seizures should 
require probable cause would a have significant benefits, as suggested 
throughout this Article.  States would have incentives to limit the 
number of investigations triggering such severe consequences to 
children through mechanisms like differential response.  States would 
also face incentives to individualize investigations to a greater extent, 
considering an allegation’s severity and its credibility.  The answer to 
                                                 
 341. Supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.  Court procedures can direct child 
protection agencies to use forensic interviewers, rather than less-well-trained investigators.  
For instance, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a court order that directed the interview of 
a child at a local child advocacy center.  In re G.W., No. 07A01-1201-JM-6, slip op. at 10-11 
(Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/1010 
1203tac.pdf.  The case arose under a statutory provision empowering child protection 
authorities to seek a court order for a parent “to make the child available to be interviewed,” 
IND. CODE § 31-33-8-7(d) (2012), when “good cause” exists, id. § 31-33-8-7(c). 
 342. Camreta would also be fairly easy under Schulhofer’s test, discussed supra notes 
252-253 and accompanying text.  A child protection investigation does not serve the “internal 
governance objectives” of a public school.  Rather, it balances “the individual interest in the 
security of private activity”—from a parent’s perspective, to raise one’s children as one sees 
fit, and, from a child’s, to live with one’s family—and “the public interest in effective social 
control,” which is prevention of child abuse or neglect and protection of children from such 
maltreatment; thus, Schulhofer would require a warrant and probable cause.  Schulhofer, 
supra note 4, at 118. 
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every allegation need not be an invasive search of a home and 
nonconsensual interviews of children.  Incredible allegations, or 
allegations that appear motivated by personal quarrels among adults, 
need not trigger such invasions (and could not, under a ruling outlined 
above).343 
 We can imagine two twists of the facts in Camreta.  First, assume 
that a child protection investigator visits a school to speak with school 
staff.  A teacher takes the child to the investigator, who explains their 
job.  The child responds, “Can I tell you about what my dad does to me 
when he drinks?” and the investigator then takes the child to the 
multidisciplinary center for an interview.  If a child voluntarily speaks 
with state officials, then there should be no Fourth Amendment 
problem.344  Although they may not understand the consequences of 
disclosing abuse to child protection officials, the child appears to 
consent willingly to an interview of reasonable duration.  And if 
children can voluntarily speak to police when they themselves face law 
enforcement consequences, it stands to reason that they can also speak 
to child protection officials when they may face child protection 
consequences.  Because a voluntary conversation is permitted, some 
very limited contact with children to determine if they will voluntarily 
talk with investigators should be permitted, but with close scrutiny of 
the voluntariness of a child’s response.345 
 Second, assume that, following a detailed investigative regimen, a 
child protection investigator determines that there is reasonable 
suspicion that a father molested his daughter.  Following administrative 
protocol, he performs as much investigation as possible without 
revealing the existence of an investigation to the child or her parents by 
speaking with school staff and others familiar with the family.  He then 
seeks the mother’s consent to take the child to a multidisciplinary 
center to be interviewed about the alleged abuse by a trained forensic 
interviewer.  This would be the only investigatory interview of the 
child and it would be recorded in its entirety.  The mother refuses to 
consent, denying any abuse.  The investigator then brings the child to 
the center for an interview and invites the parent to attend.  This twist 
                                                 
 343. Cf. supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
 344. Justice Sonia Sotomayor suggested this point in the Camreta oral arguments, 
suggesting that if S.G. had told Camreta, “I wish somebody had asked me before[;] I’m so 
afraid of my daddy,” then a seizure surely would be acceptable.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 94, at 37-38. 
 345. The Supreme Court recently held that a child’s age is a relevant factor in 
determining whether they were in custody for purposes of obtaining Miranda warnings.  
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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supposes more effective administrative limits on official discretion.  
The interview itself would be more rigorous and effective than the 
interview actually performed in Camreta.  The interviewer would 
follow more-certain protocols; each interview would necessarily 
follow its own course, but the methods used would be more 
standardized than under a regime that permitted each individual 
investigator to interview children when and how they saw fit.  
Although a closer case than Camreta, I would not apply the special 
needs doctrine and would require a warrant and probable cause before 
such a seizure could take place because the immediate and potential 
consequence to the child is so severe, and, separately, the remaining 
discretion to the state official is so great, especially the discretion to 
determine when evidence established that a forensic interview was 
necessary, that these protections are essential.  It must be noted that 
this result would not necessarily prevent the interview from occurring; 
probable cause may well exist and indicate that a multidisciplinary 
center interview would reveal evidence of child abuse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 I ended the previous section with a reevaluation of the Camreta 
facts.  The questions asked in evaluating those facts, whether the 
seizure at issue implicated a fundamental constitutional right and 
whether the seizure followed an administrative protocol that 
adequately limited state actors’ discretion, are more relevant to 
evaluating a search and seizure than, as the present special needs 
doctrine requires, simply asking if a law enforcement purpose exists.  
Reforming the special needs doctrine to focus on its core purposes 
(protecting individuals when the consequences to them are 
constitutionally significant and incentivizing all levels of government 
to avoid the harshest consequences and to use democratic processes to 
develop meaningful limits on executive discretion) will lead to more 
logical legal rules and more effective protections for core Fourth 
Amendment values. 
